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Abstract

This thesis is an examination of physical pain in ancient tragedy, with the focus
on three plays: Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound and Sophocles’ Philoctetes and
Trachiniae. The study unfolds the layers of several conceptual systems in order
get closer to the core—pain and its limits in tragedy. The first chapter aims to
show that Aristotle’s model for the analysis of tragedy in his classificatory tract,
the Poetics, centered on the ill-defined concept of mimesis, is an attempt to tame
pain and clean tragedy of its inherent viscerality. The second chapter looks at the
dualist solution advanced by Plato and Descartes, while showing that a discourse
rooted in dualism alienates pain from tragedy. The third chapter provides axes of
analysis for three tragedies where pain plays a central role by using the idea of
pain as an experience of the limit and looking at the different ways in which pain
splits the subject. The thesis also advances the idea that, for the most part,
conceptual frames act as analgesic systems that obstruct the exposure to the
experience of intensity in ancient tragedy.
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Introduction:
The main purpose of this thesis is to clean the slate for a fresher reading
of tragedy through pain. This goal seems overly ambitious for a master’s thesis
and the form of this project reflects the choices I had to make in order to
accommodate and contain such a wide scope. The present thesis is also an
attempt to find other means for the examination of ancient texts. I find that the
most fitting methodology for this objective is discourse analysis. Through this
methodology, as well as through several efforts carried out in this thesis of
opening unconventional axes of analysis, I carry out this attempt, which is not
one of reappropriating tragedy and affixing it to the field that I am affiliated to,
but, rather, one of challenging a hegemonic frame of reference. The challenge of
shifting the perspective of analysis in the specific case of the ancient corpus,
which has long been under the administration of Classical Studies, is not only
one of the rigour that the analysis of Greek and Latin texts necessitates, but
also the challenge that the burden of proof places on one pleading for an
alternative reception of ancient texts. Were this a project carried out by means
of the traditional tools available to a classicist, the question of association to a
field would not have been a pressing one. But then, of course, the project would
have also been shaped differently, although still not devoid of theoretical
challenges. As Wlad Godzich notes, “[t]here is no atheoretical approach to
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literature; there are only more or less consciously held theoretical tenets.”

Since, however, this thesis is written within the field of Comparative Literature,
it is important to clarify two issues: why discourse analysis is a method
compatible with this field; and why is pain a suitable entry point into a
nontraditional analysis of tragedy?
This thesis does not proceed on the basis of a clear differentiation
between theoretical texts and literature “proper.” It distinguishes, however,
between different systems of conceptualization and tragic language. Philological
analysis is usually the method of choice for the examination of ancient texts; a
student in the department of Classics is usually trained, on one hand, in
reading Greek and Latin and, on the other hand, in the textual analysis of the
texts in the original language, with a focus on grammatical structures. In my
experience, I found philological analysis to be a very useful tool, one that reveals
the inner mechanisms and subtleties of texts, creating the conditions necessary
for a familiarization with the language. Also, since this type of analysis
functions primarily by isolating the text from its larger historical context, the
result it that the classicist works primarily within the enclosed universe of the
text, without taking into account the conceptual patterns that, many times,
creep into his own analysis. Besides taking distance from this type of approach
to textual analysis, this thesis engages in discourse analysis in order to

Wlad Godzich, “Emergent Literature and Comparative Literature,” in The
Comparative Perspective on Literature: Approaches to Theory and Practice, ed. Clayton
Koelb and Susan Noakes (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), 23.
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challenge several conceptual patterns, such as Aristotelian categorization and
dualism, which act as superstructures whenever notions of tragic language and
corporeality are discussed. In an attempt to delineate the discipline of
Comparative Literature, Godzich writes:
In relation to disciplines, “field” refers to a parcel of the culturally
constructed domain as it is subject to the operations of the apparatus of
knowledge, whereas field (without quotation marks) is the enabling
condition of cultural elaboration. At this juncture, I would like to put
forward the following claim: the “field” of Comparative Literature is field.
In other words, I take it that, within the prevalent organization of
knowledge, it is incumbent upon comparatists to inquire into the
2
relationship of culture to givenness, to its other.
As a comparatist, I am using discourse analysis to question the givenness that
lays the foundation of a tradition of analysis of ancient texts. In this project I
am only able to address the aforementioned conceptual systems that are part of
this givenness, which is only the beginning of an inquiry related to tragedy. As a
comparatist with Classical Studies training, I can both work with the Greek
text and distinguish patterns in the reception of ancient texts that result in the
appropriation of these texts by specific fields for purposes that are in line with
their own agendas only. A return to textual analysis and a recontextualization
of the texts after the deconstruction undertaken in this project will be
undertaken in a subsequent project, if the alignment of future events will
permit it.

2

Godzich, Emergent Literature, 28.
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I choose to center this whole project on the notion of pain first of all
because, as it will become apparent, it is a notion that cannot be encapsulated
by available conceptual systems I am analyzing here in relation to tragedy. It is,
therefore, a tool for the deconstruction I am undertaking through discourse
analysis in alignment with the scope of the discipline of Comparative
Literature. Secondly, through this project centered on pain I want to clarify
several concerns I have, both intellectual and spiritual: the relation between
pain as the limit of the world perceived through the senses, as well as the way
the experience of intense pain breaks habits and patterns of comfort, while
exposing one’s inherent helplessness. My interest in pain as a subject of study
started a few years ago, during an intensive meditation retreat where I was
practicing a type meditation called Vipassana, rooted in the Theravada
Buddhist tradition. In this tradition, one is taught that the three marks of
existence are impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and the non-self
(anatta). Through the practice of Vipassana, the meditator works towards the
comprehension of these three facts of existence and, by undoing the attachment
to the body, the world and the false beliefs that generate suffering, he strives to
3

“see things as they really are.” The constant observation of sensations in the
body (which is the task of the Vipassana meditator) leads, through consistent
practice, to non-reaction—a state of being distanced from the body. This is, in

“The Three Basic Facts of Existence: I. Impermanence (Anicca).” Pref. by
Nyanaponika Thera. Access to Insight, accessed September 7, 2015.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/various/wheel186.html
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my experience, a peaceful state indeed, but it is also a state of remoteness from
life. Based on my own experience, I argue that, for the beginner meditator in
this tradition, peacefulness is a simulation rather than a state where insight is
possible. The philosophy behind the Vipassana practice links all emotions and
thoughts to sensations in the body, which can be empirically observed. The task,
then, is to not react internally, but to remain throughout an observer of all
sensations and the succession of emotions and thoughts. One aspect that I
consider to be problematic in this outlook is the vilification of the sensations
and, consequently, of the body. This, in Buddhism, does not lead to a projection
of a soul outside of the body, as I will discuss in the second chapter of this thesis
next to dualism, but to a deconstruction of reality and of the narratives related
to self, personality, instincts, desires, thoughts, emotions, habits and behaviour.
The freedom that detachment affords comes from the recognition of the basic
principle of impermanence, followed by the non-identification with the
aforementioned facts related to the self. Yet, this is problematic due to the a
priori sentencing of suffering. Moreover, the deconstruction of the self that the
Vipassana technique aims at heralds a constructed, serene death through a
process that is sometimes irreversible. In my own meditation experience I found
the sensations themselves to contain more genuineness than the Theravada
Buddhists give them credit for. Descartes, in his Meditations, uses repeatedly
descriptions of sensation when laying out his dualist argument. As I discovered
in my own meditation practice, pain is the sensation that, when felt with certain
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intensity, would dissolve all detachment, bringing the attention back not only to
the body, but to that very limb or part of the body where it manifests. Based on
this, I hold that, rather than subduing the world of sensations either through
this meditation technique or through conceptualization, giving credence to the
body and especially to this most insolent sensation, pain, would grant a glimpse
into a different kind of truth, perhaps a visceral one. I dare use this personal
experience for my inquiry here, while acknowledging the risk that, at times, the
tone of this thesis might turn from academic to confessional. It is ironic that
narcissism be exposed in an exercise against authority, but concealment would
not aid discourse in any manner either. In what follows, I provide an overview
of the main ideas underlying this project.
This thesis comprises a study of three ancient tragedies centered on the
notion of pain (Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, Sophocles’ Philoctetes and the
Trachiniae) as delineated by the concept of the limit. The constitutional
difficulty of such a project is given by the fact that, once articulated in these
terms, the analysis of pain stalls, since the experience of the hermeneutist, as
that of the spectator, is tuned with that of the sufferer: the imminence of pain
arrests all discourse. In spite of this difficulty, pain constitutes a focus in tragic
poetry and this alone is a valid reason for undertaking such a project. Pain is
not simply inserted into tragedy; rather, it stands at its core. Fighting pain’s
inherent inexpressibility, Aeschylus and Sophocles find ways of integrating it in
tragedy and the result is that all tools of expression are tested and enriched.

7

Language finds new ways of expressing; the characters’ mythological traits are
challenged, unveiling unforeseen nuances. Additionally, pain signals towards a
viscerality or rawness inherent in tragedy. Out of the three tragic playwrights
whose works are extant, Aeschylus and Sophocles are concerned with pain
directly and the notion of viscerality, well intuited by Antonin Artaud, the
avant-garde theatre theorist and performer. Artaud’s writings on theatre in the
beginning of the twentieth century focus on the idea of destruction through
suffering, pain, and the deconstruction of language and thought. His desire is to
revitalize theatre and to shake its structure until both the artists and the public
recognize a need to return to a ritualized, spiritual theatre. Artaud tries to bring
back to theatre some of the rawness that the Ancient Greeks had access to and,
in a way, he echoes those aspects in Greek theatre that have been long
overlooked. Artaud emphasizes the need for his contemporaries to pay attention
to a rawness of representation that he associates with ritualistic forms of
theatre, such as Balinese and Greek theatre. However, Artaud lacks a
theoretical apparatus and his writings only point towards his intentions
regarding theatrical representation, but they do so with a pathos that both
fascinates and provokes.
I am choosing to leave out Euripides’ work out of this analysis because he
seems to lack the rawness in expression that the other two playwrights retain.
Euripides, while still a valuable source for the examiner of suffering, is affected
by a standard that resonates too well with Aristotle’s mimetic model, which I
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am discussing in the first chapter of this thesis. This is signalled in Aristotle’s
own text, the Poetics, where Euripides is judged as best in what concerns the
construction of a tragic plot:
4

Wherefore, those who are accusing Euripides with doing this in his
tragedies are wrong in saying that he does this in his tragedies and that
many of his characters end in misfortune. That is, as was shown, correct.
A very good example: for on the stage and in competitions such plays
appear the most tragic of all, if they succeed; and even if Euripides is in
other respects not a good administrator, yet he certainly seems to be the
5
most tragic of the poets.
According to Aristotle’s rules, which I will discuss in the first chapter,
Euripides’ incorporates in his tragedies that which Aristotle finds valuable,
which, in turn, makes them the most tragic. This may be true in Aristotle’s
terms, but in focusing excessively on tragic action, the depth of what tragedy
tries to convey is missed. This is emphatically true in the case of suffering and
pain.
In the three plays I am analyzing, pain and that which it unveils takes
precedence over plot. One other play, which is not included here, namely
Sophocles’ Ajax, while not directly involving physical pain, does, nonetheless,
expose the main character to such intense emotional and mental suffering that

All translations of Aristotle and Plato from Greek (cited mainly in the first and second
chapter) are my own, although several other translations and commentaries have been
consulted in the process. The translations from the tragic texts are by different
consecrated translators, cited in the specific sections of the thesis.

4

Aristotle, Ars Poetica, ed. R. Kassel (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1966), accessed 4
August 2015, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3atext%3a1999.01.0055,
153a 24-30.
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it achieves the same result as the plays where physical pain is approached
directly: it brings a great hero to the limit of despondency, where he is laid bare
of all the extensions of his former greatness. In doing so, Ajax’s case is similar to
another mighty hero’s, Heracles, whose story is discussed here in the third
chapter.
It is necessary, for the development of this thesis, to address several
conceptual systems. I am doing so on one hand in order to clear the path
discourse-wise and get closer to the essence of the notion of pain, and on the
other hand as a protest against subsequent developments in the theatre
tradition and in the history of thought, where systems and concepts gain much
acceptance and, eventually, enough political ground, turning into harmful
ideologies. Whether the role of pain in tragedy is to challenge cultural
stereotypes, achieve original means of expression, put the spectator on the same
wavelength with a suffering individual, thus preparing him for an experience
which is unavoidable, or all of the above, is very hard to determine. What is
clear, however, is that Aeschylus and Sophocles do not shun pain in their plays.
Elaine Scarry points to the fact that, while intense pain arrests language and is
undeniably personal due to the impossibility of sharing it with another entirely,
it is also impossible to hide. She notes that “pain comes unsharably into our
midst as at once that which cannot be denied and that which cannot be
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confirmed.” The complications that arise from this are explored in tragedy
especially through the interactions of the suffering characters with their
interlocutors, but also, and maybe even especially in the relation between
spectators and stage. If all other elements in tragedy can be renarrativized or
conceptualized differently, pain does not allow this. Nor does it allow any
numbing mechanism to develop. Aristotle, Plato and Descartes take charge of
the manufacturing of concepts that intermediate, explain and numb feeling. The
impact these conceptual systems have results in the vilification of the corporeal
and the construction of an artificial system through which one can detach
oneself from the clenches of the visceral. However, Aeschylus and Sophocles
refuse to prescribe this kind of pill. After challenging the analgesic systems of
Aristotle, Plato and Descartes in the first and second chapter, I will be looking
at pain and its exposure to different limits and pointing to the axes of analysis
that this notion unveils.
Therefore, chapter by chapter, this projects unfolds as follows:
Chapter one looks at Aristotle’s Poetics in order to show that his model is
a synthetic one through which he attempts to tame pain and clean tragedy of its
inherent viscerality. My analysis in this chapter addresses mainly the concepts
of mimesis and catharsis, then brings up the notion of ananke, which provides
an alternative to Aristotle’s system in relation to tragedy. Aristotle holds that
language in tragedy should be pleasant and expressive. Yet, when exposed to

6

Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 4.
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pain, language is broken in raw expressions and it does not follow the rules of
metrics. With respect to exposing actions and character to pain, I side with
Ricoeur, who favours actions as embodied series of events over plot, which is
their logical reduction. Pain challenges action; as the mimesis of an action is
itself an action, it stands to reason to call it an action twice removed. As action
is substituted for by the plot, the action appears to be thrice removed, thus
taming pain to the point of unrecognition. The heroes are also split by pain,
which puts them in a passive, vulnerable position. Breaking the narrative and
changing its course, pain puts Aristotle’s categorical thought to test. Mimesis,
then, acts as a screen between world and tragedy, where the world is distilled
and pain is tamed through a process of logical categorization. The second part of
this chapter deals with Aristotle’s concept of catharsis, as a purgation of
emotions through pity and fear. The immanence of pain challenges Aristotle’s
explanation of the emotions as part of the plot. Adopting Aristotle’s system
means that pain has a clear purpose and intelligibility in relation to the
spectator; thus, pain is alleviated through logical understanding—its cure.
Therefore, pain in tragedy, through its immanence and intensity, points to the
rawness of representation that cannot be explained through Aristotle’s system.
Ananke, the alternative notion that I discuss at the end of the first chapter, acts
as a system internally balancing life. Ananke does not alleviate pain because it
is not used as an intermediating concept, but as a system that exposes
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vulnerability. Therefore, Ananke does not extricate the sufferer from the world
of pain.
The second chapter attempts to show that a discourse rooted in dualism
alienates pain from tragedy. By focusing on the body in pain as an exposed
subject and with the help of Jean Luc Nancy’s notion of pain as limit, I
challenge Plato’s and Descartes’ dualistic thought. Plato, in the Phaedo, argues
that the immortal soul must detach itself from its mortal receptacle: the
deceitful, impure body. The soul must strive to become one with the undivided,
pure divine. For Descartes, on the other hand one can penetrate the body
through the mind. But intense pain dissolves the opposition between body and
soul, thus cancelling the possibility of cognition. So both Plato and Descartes
advance systems that put the body at a distance and come up with concepts
such as mind and soul to mediate between realms. This is inconsistent with the
tragic sphere, where there are no concepts and where pain is immanent and
undeniable. Pain is there to split and expose the subject. Confronting dualism
as such does not necessarily mean that I am advancing a holistic notion of the
body. But I hold that in tragedy, the body is not approached by means of an
intermediating conceptual system.
In chapter three, I open the ground for several axes of analysis, through a
hermeneutical approach. The investigation of pain in the texts is of a
diagrammatic nature because a formalist textual analysis could not possibly
serve the purpose of this thesis. In this chapter I am using pain as an
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experience of the limit, and am looking at the different ways in which pain
splits the subject. In the case of Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, a split is
produced between the immortal and mortal realms; the intensity of Prometheus’
pain and his complete lack of agency challenge the notion that the body of a god
belongs to a realm of immutability and plenitude. Pain and torture break down
Prometheus’ world. From being creator of the human world, he is exposed as a
vulnerable, incapacitated being. In the case of Philoctetes, pain is used to split
the sufferer from the outside world through an “epistemic blockage.” Pain also
tests the limits of language, by reducing the hero to an inarticulate creature. In
the Trachiniae, the split that pain effects works at the level of the character.
Heracles is on one hand weakened, humiliated and made to whimper like a girl,
and on the other exposed in all his grotesque, bestial egomania.
A study of pain, no matter how well defined, securely construed or, on the
other hand, evasive or labyrinthine, will always reach a limit of expression.
Pain is a concept that cannot be conceptualized, a moment that cannot be
pinned down in time, an impression on the body which cannot be taken out of it
and represented in a direct manner. However, in writing this thesis, one idea,
connected to the above-quoted passage by Elaine Scarry, which the Greeks
seemed to have understood, was prevalent, namely that pain is that which we
cannot express to each other, but through which we all connect: in pain we are
all alike.

14

Finally, I must acknowledge that this project is inspired by Nietzsche’s
Birth of Tragedy, which prompted me to work against a type of Apollonian
discourse and align the inquiry into my topic with a Dionysian approach,
centered on pain.
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Chapter 1
Aristotle, Pain Will Tear Us Apart
While the present thesis is not concerned with the study of tragedy as
genre, nor essentially with the themes that frequently come up in theoretical
works on tragedy, but specifically with the occurrence of pain in tragedy, it is
still necessary to commence by taking into account Aristotle’s work on mimetic
art—the Poetics. In this tract, Aristotle examines, through a process of
classification, what he considers to be essential in poetry, specifically in epic
and tragedy. At first sight, the Poetics seems to merely provide a set of
peremptory pronouncements on the art of poetry. At a second, some of the
notions he sets ground for seem to be founded on fortuitous assumptions.
Nevertheless, it is the first extant work that looks at tragedy’s modus operandi
without being guided to do so by a didactic impulse (although a moralizing djinn
does creep in at 1454a and b, when Aristotle expresses his partiality towards
good character in tragedy as opposed to the bad variety, prevalent in comedy).
In the Poetics, then, Aristotle discusses poetry as craft (τέχνη) and
classifies, in twenty-six passages, the aspects that constitute good poetry. In
what concerns tragedy, its six components are plot (µῦθος), character (ἦθος),
diction (λέξις), thought (διάνοια), appearance or spectacle (ὄψις) and music
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(µελοποιία)7. Central to his development of an analysis of tragedy are also the
concepts of mimesis (µίµησις) and catharsis (κάθαρσις)8, which I will investigate
in this chapter in their relation (or lack of, thereof) to pain in tragedy. The
ubiquitously-cited definition of tragedy appears in section six of the tract and
reads thus:
Tragedy, then, is the imitation of a serious and complete action, which
has magnitude, by means of language with pleasurable accessories, each
kind brought in separately in the parts of the work, by acting, not by
narrating, with incidents arousing pity and fear, in order to accomplish
9
the catharsis of such emotions.
The definition works on three axes: those of the action, language and emotions.
In what follows, I will unpack the main conceptual elements of this
classification and argue that Aristotle is missing one important component in
his internal taxonomy of tragedy, one that the incidence of pain in most ancient
Greek plays and particularly in the tragedies that constitute the corpus for this
thesis, provides the clue to, namely the viscerality of representation.

7

Aristotle, Poetics, section six.

I will not continue the pretentious practice of transliterating all Greek terms; I will
use, from here on, the terms not italicized, especially since mimesis, catharsis and
praxis are commonly used in critical theory as such. Other terms, less frequent in
critical literature, which I am introducing as the argument procedes, such as ananke, I
will italicize throughout.

8

9

Aristotle, Poetics, 1449b 24-28.
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1.1 Mimesis, Praxis and Pain
Mimesis, which is usually rendered in English translations either as
“imitation” or “representation,” is the first concept I will be dealing with here,
since it is central to Aristotle’s definition of tragedy. In fact, this is the only
concept that expands throughout the whole tract. There is a generalized
10

tendency among Aristotelian scholars

to examine the main ideas in the Poetics

as rooted in the need to respond to Plato’s dismissal of poets and their art in the
Republic and Laws. However, there is no textual evidence in the Poetics that
Aristotle is attempting to counter Plato’s dogmatic critique of mimetic poetry.
For Plato, as Paul Woodruff explains:
(…) mimesis is often understood to involve deception, and is very often
used pejoratively of arts or crafts which Plato considers harmful or at
least inferior. When Plato does not use the term pejoratively he uses it as
part of a metaphysical theory. Yet neither the pejorative nor the
metaphysical use surfaces in the Poetics, though most scholars hear
echoes of Plato there. What is even more remarkable, Aristotle makes no
mention of any differences he may have with Plato’s mimesis.11
Aristotle, then, is not concerned with Plato’s metaphysical preoccupation
with what concerns mimesis. For Plato, especially in Book X of the Republic, the
work of art imitates things as they appear in the world, while these things

Such as: J. W. H. Atkins, Literary criticism in antiquity (Cambridge, 1934) and
Richard McKeon, “Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity,”
Modern Philology 34 (1936): 1-35.

10

Paul Woodruff, “Aristotle on Mimēsis,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed. Amélie
Rort (Chichester : Princeston University Press, 1992), 75.

11
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themselves are imitations of ideas. This is problematic in Plato’s case because it
follows that the work of art is twice removed from the world of ideas and,
therefore, artists deceive through their mimetic art and should not be entrusted
with education in Plato’s ideal state, as he claims they are. Paul Ricœur, in the
first volume of Temps et récit, is correct in noting that, as opposed to Plato’s
rendition of mimesis, “Aristotle’s mimesis has just a single space wherein it is
unfolded—human making [faire], the arts of composition.”12
In order to analyze the use of mimesis in Aristotle’s definition of tragedy,
I will track it back to the beginning of the treatise. Aristotle uses the term
mimesis several times, but he never defines it; instead, the concept’s meaning
transpires through his contextual use of the term. Its first use, at the outset of
the Poetics, is the following generalizing statement, where he puts all forms of
poetry under the umbrella of mimesis and where he also starts the process of
categorization, which will lead to his definition of tragedy:
Epic and the poetry of tragedy, as well as comedy, dithyrambic poetry and
most of flute playing and citharaplaying—all together happen to be
modes of mimesis; but they differ one from another in three ways: in
representing13 either by different means, or in the different objects or in
representing not in the same way but in a different manner. For example
through both color and form people represent many things, making

Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 34.

12

I have translated the verbs that are cognates of mimesis by “representing,” since
“making mimesis” is redundant.

13
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likeness of them14 (some by means of a craft and some through
acquaintance), while others by use of the human voice. In this way, in the
mentioned arts, they all make representations in rhythm and language
15
and tune, using these means either separately or in combination.
Mimesis, then, has different facets, depending on the means, objects and
manner of representation, all of which apply to tragedy and are mentioned in
Aristotle’s definition; yet mimesis is also a unifying concept. Given the
broadness of this enumeration, it is not clear how mimesis is related to craft
(τέχνη). Likewise, it is unclear if the making of an object’s likeness is related to
acquaintance or custom. Here he uses the word συνήθεια, which seems to carry
somewhat derisive implied accents, as it suggests a sort of ingenium honed
through ars as opposed to acquired artistry; in Aristotle’s assessment, the
balance noticeably tilts towards the latter. This is an intriguing point because
the relation between craft and nature is facilitated through mimesis, as he
argues in Physics (199a), where mimesis is a method of intervention when
nature is faulty (through the craft of medicine, for example). It is reasonable to
postulate, then, that Aristotle builds a system with the aid of the concept of
mimesis through which he attempts to cure or at least correct that which is
aberrant in nature, such as pain. If, then, representing things through custom,
acquaintance, ingenium and, by extension, instinct, is a lesser activity than

ἀπεικάζω translates, unlike µιµέοµαι, as “making a copy in the likeness of something,”
but also as “imagine”. It is related to the noun ἀπείκασµα, which means “copy,”
“representation”. So, if considered hierarchically, the former is one step down on the
scale of abstraction.
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representing through craft, tragedy is stripped of a certain type of rawness,
which, I believe, is crucial and completely overlooked in most studies concerned
with tragedy from Aristotle onwards. So turning towards the notion of pain
through the occurrences of which I will show that not everything in tragedy is a
construct that aims to explain or resolve, it can be shown that Aristotle’s mode
of classification misses the point. In what follows, I will take up each of
Aristotle’s categories and illustrate how in ancient tragedy, especially in the
plays I am looking at, pain shakes the ground on which these modes are built
and, therefore, the concept of mimesis itself is thus challenged.
1.1.1 Means of Representation
There are certain arts which use all those means that were mentioned; I
am speaking of those such as rhythm and tune and metre, for example
dithyrambic and “nomic” poetry and tragedy too and comedy: they differ
is that some use all these at once, others use them in succession. These
differences between arts, I say, are those that bring mimesis into
16
existence.
So rhythm, tune and metre are the means of representation in poetic arts here,
but “language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in
the parts of the work” appears in the definition of tragedy. Hence, while the
means employed in mimetic arts in general are the three aforementioned,
tragedy hinges on language, which is diversified (or made pleasant) through
other modes, by which I infer that language assists in the procurement of
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aesthetic pleasure rather than serving a purely utilitarian purpose. Following
through with the definition, I also deduce that language must be sufficiently
detailed in order to convey a range of actions and emotions (although the
relevant ones here are pity and fear). However, when examining the incidence of
pain in tragedy, it is clear that language is neither complex, not pleasant.
Building towards a theory of pain, Elaine Scarry argues that the
experience of pain escapes language, abandoning the victim confused and muted
by its incommunicability. Her argument is based on the rightful assertion that
language is destroyed by pain: the experience is forceful and words fail as soon
as one is exposed to it. It is impossible, according to her, to find a manner of
expressing pain that accurately articulates its severity. As Scarry puts it:
“physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing
about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and
cries a human being makes before language is learned.”17 Where pain makes an
apparition in Greek tragedy, language is used only to suggest, but neither
words, nor metre, nor any other mimetic mode get to the core of the experience.
Scarry ascribes this mode of experience to an “absolute split between one’s sense
of one’s own reality and the reality of other persons.”18 She continues by
contending that it is exactly through this divide between language and reality
that pain attains the suggestion of the experience’s force: “Thus, pain comes
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unsharably into our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and that
which cannot be confirmed. Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through
its unsharability, and it ensures this unsharability through its resistance to
language.”19 As immanent and inexorable the experience of pain is, the
expression of it is fundamentally contaminated by its essential ineffability. It
follows that, where pain is expressed in tragedy, words are often replaced by
cries and shrieks, thus language, instead of articulating, is broken down, but
still, as I will show in the third chapter of this thesis, manages to perform.
There is, then, in the expression of pain, simultaneously the destruction and
creation of language, as Scarry goes on to argue.
Philoctetes, one of the plays that constitute the focus of the third chapter,
is worthy of attention here because it explores physical pain methodically and
meticulously, while also placing the suffering subject in an environment and
situation that reflect his pain. The context of this play proves that Sophocles
was well aware of the potency of pain: all action and the Trojan War itself are
halted in order to deal with the agony of a disposed man. The hero, Philoctetes,
unlike other heroes in Greek epic and tragedy, such as Odysseus, his antagonist
in this play, is neither influential, nor virile, but a frail, suffering man, isolated
on the deserted island of Lemnos. When examining the core of this tragedy, one
cannot make valid claims about the usage of language with pleasurable
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accessories. This following exchange between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, at
the end of a long scene of agony, conveys the nauseating disintegration of
language and, I think, the point of such a passage in a play is to illustrate the
failure of language and the necessity to go beyond it:
Neoptolemus: Yes, terrible is the burden of the disease.
Philoctetes: Terrible that cannot be spoken! Oh, have pity upon me!

20

What else can more clearly demonstrate the failure of Aristotle’s mimetic model
of expression through language that this last line uttered by the suffering hero:
“δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ῥητόν” (terrible that cannot be spoken)? Philoctetes experiences a
complete disconnection from any cognitive process that could help him explain
or narrate his experience. The young Neoptolemus is forced, thus, to remain
outside of the suffering, in spite of trying to access it through understanding,
and that causes an extreme alienation between the sufferer and anyone who
could offer compassion (which means, literally, to suffer with). In Philoctetes,
the episodes in which Philoctetes is in extreme pain are most vivid, but they do
not advance the plot in any way. A limit of both language and sentience is
reached here, through the gradual intensification of pain, the breakdown of
language into cries and groans and, finally, as Philoctetes faints, the cessation
of sentience and language. I return to the analysis of the whole scene of which

This fragment from Philoctetes is in my own translation, but the subsequent ones are
from Aeschylus, The Women of Trachis and Philoctetes, trans. Robert Torrance.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin),1966. 754-756.
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the above-quoted lines are part of in the third chapter, when I investigate pain
in light of the experience of limit. For the time being, it has been established
that Aristotle’s concept of mimesis does not stand its ground in what concerns
the means of representation when faced with the occurrence of pain. The
following axis of investigation follows Aristotle’s next piece in the construction
of a concept of mimesis, namely the things that are being represented.
1.1.2 Objects of Representation: Actions and Characters.
Since the things being represented by the imitators are actions, it is
necessary for the agents to be either good men or inferior, since, nearly
always, characters are made unique, for all differ in character through
vice and virtue, therefore they are either better than us or inferior in such
21
wise. It is the same with painters.
Praxis appears as the first element of the definition of tragedy and here, in this
more general account of mimetic arts, it seems to be the precursor of plot or, as
Ricœur calls it, the definiens Aristotle substitutes for the definiendum.22 This
element is of great importance for Aristotle, since he focuses on it almost
exclusively from section seven until the twenty-sixth. Ricoeur goes as much as
to advance the idea that muthos is the core of tragedy and of mimesis:
This quasi-identification is warranted first by placing the six parts into a
hierarchy that gives priority to the what or object of representation (plot,
characters, thought) in relation to the by which or means (language and
melody) and the how or mode (the spectacle); then by a second
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hierarchization internal to the what that sets the action above the
characters and the thought. (…) At the conclusion of this double
hierarchization, the plot appears as the first principle, the end, the
purpose, and, if we may say so, the soul of tragedy.23
He further argues that the contention that mimesis is first and foremost defined
through muthos, as persuasive as it may seem, is not to be taken too far and he
is right in noting that in the Poetics there is no evidence that would support this
claim, in spite of the length of Aristotle’s commentary on plot and its elements.
Praxis, when looked at through the lens of emplotment in tragedy, is a construct
of an action. As Kosman articulates it, “the medium of the mimesis of action is
itself an action”24—so an action twice removed. Dramatic art, then, is defined
through the construct of the mimesis of action. The kind of action that is
represented in drama (serious and complete) is secondary to this claim. From
here follows that to talk about pain in dramatic form is to talk about an
unrepresentable non-action, which somehow still makes its way in Greek
tragedy. This—Aristotle does not take into account. Representing pain in the
mimetic way that Aristotle proposes, as the action of an action—therefore acting
what pain looks like, through actions, shrieks, words, etc., is at least
unsatisfactory. Rather, what happens in a theatrical production is the
recreation in the moment, with the help of a construct, of a particular instant.
Inserting pain into this section of Aristotle’s model is again problematic because
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to represent pain on Aristotle’s terms can be read as an attempt at taming pain.
Reliance on mimetic mechanics to give pain shape in tragedy would result in
plotting the actions that are projected onto pain—so we are thrice removed from
the pain itself: by the fact that pain happens to someone who is a character
written by a poet and acted by an actor, but also through language and the
medium. Rather, after an examination of pain in tragedy, it appears that when
pain is not performed, it is approximated, either by the employment of images,
such as the objects that represent agents of pain. For example, the chains in
Prometheus Bound, the cloak in Trachiniae or even the wound or body part
itself in Philoctetes are good examples of approximation in relation to external
objects. This can also be done through the temporal, spatial, sensory or affective
dimensions. These terms, however, only approximate, through a process that
25

Scary calls analogical substantiation , where the pain felt by the sufferer is
projected onto something else—an object external to the sensation itself. An
example that is easy to comprehend is that of the knife cutting through the
skin: the pain is attributed to the object that inflicts it, but pain is in the body,
not in the knife.
The process of mimesis through action is removed from the core of pain
also because the characters are the ones doing the action that gets represented
in drama. However, as in the above-quoted excerpt from Philoctetes, it is clear
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that the main character is in no capacity to participate in a praxis of any kind—
he is completely devoid of agency when he is immersed in suffering. What is
relevant and what tragic poets seem to have understood is not the construct of
plot that traps action as in a mesh, in order to represent it, after steamrolling it,
on stage, for a public that is waiting to feel the emotions and go through a
process of purgation, but rather the immediacy of being immersed in a state and
the incapacitating intensity of that state. Pain in tragedy has the opposite effect
of the positivist mimetic action, build through action, plot and pleasant
language, as Aristotle’s definition premises.
Aristotle’s insistence on good versus inferior character demonstrates that
there are, in fact, traces of Plato’s influence in his theory of poetic arts. In
tragedy, in the presence of pain, the good/bad dichotomy is obliterated and the
characters’ bearings are consistent and independent of the nature of his
character or of his previous actions. It is the case, for example, of proud and
revengeful Ajax, whose misfortune is as actual as that of a worthier hero would
have been.
The remaining constituent of Aristotle’s system of mimesis, namely
manner, is subordinated to and contingent on the previous elements, language
and action.
1.1.3 Manner of Representation
A third difference in these arts is the manner in which one may represent
each of these objects. For in representing the same objects by the same
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means it is possible to report at one moment by narrative and at another
by assuming a character, as Homer does, or by executing things as they
are throughout, without change, or else the imitators may act out all
26
things as though they were executing them.
The important notion here is that the focus is shifted from the representation
itself to the things doing the representing; the kind of mimetic art used for this
purpose is not specified, so it follows that this can be applied to all poetic arts.
The author, then, can either narrate the action, or use indirect speech, or he can
act out the characters himself. This mode of mimesis is relevant for the
problematisation of pain because it takes into consideration the relation
between author and character, although, as Ricœur notes, since for Aristotle
character is subordinated to action27, mimesis is a representation of the action
of characters. This idea is at the core of many attempts to argue that Aristotle
aims, by looking at mimesis as pure imitation, to develop a theory of realism.
The work of the author is to represent by reporting (ἀπαγγέλλοντα), regardless of
whether this act is carried out in dramatic or epic form. Although pain resists
language and accurate representation, it still does appear in tragedy and in
literature, which shows that its fictionalisation is significant. By metaphoric
approximation, pain is nevertheless represented outside of the body; the
purpose that it serves in tragedy is still to be discussed, but this last mode of
mimesis in the Poetics is, I think, one that does not collapse when put to trial.
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The author is the agent of mimesis and it is through him that one can have
access to the fictional world of the characters and, consequently, to their pain. It
is important to remember this when attempting to analyze such concepts as
suffering and physical pain since, in the larger context of these plays, there is a
possibility that the author is manipulating a character’s suffering in order to
serve a different purpose other than an internal one.
1.2 Emotions and Catharsis
In Aristotle’s definition of tragedy, emotions must be induced in a safe
way (through mimesis rather than through real experience) and, because of
this, the cathartic relief might make the spectators into better people. The
discussion, then, moves from action, characters and the author to the spectator:
However, since (tragedy is the) mimesis not only of a complete action but
also (of incidents arousing) fear and pity, and these have the greatest
effect on the mind when they happen without control and in consequence
of one other (as an effect); for there is more marvel in them than if they
28
happened by accident or by chance…
The mimesis of action is responsible for catharsis (whether Aristotle
means by this term “purgation” or something else is not clear, but the literature
on it does tend to imply a purification of some type). The terms ἐλέος and φόβος
appear in the definition of tragedy as well and they have been translated as pity
and, respectively, fear or terror. It is not clear how exactly pity and fear would
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bring about catharsis, but it seems that Aristotle knows in detail the workings
of the spectators’ minds, although these mechanisms are not linked with the
emotions themselves, but, once again, with the plot.
The idea of a pleasurable catharsis is an unlikely one, while catharsis as
education through exposure to tragic events that arouse pity and fear in the
spectators is also problematic, for what would the audience gain in education by
being, for instance, exposed to the sufferings of a man whose disease is
contacted by mischance and who is being manipulated by a cunning politician
who is trying to steal his only possession of value, his bow? Jacob Bernays, for
example, in his famous nineteenth century work Fundamentals of Aristotle’s
Lost Essay on the “Effect of Tragedy” explains catharsis either as a religious
purification, resulting in an extatic state, or as medical purgation.
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Martha

Naussbaum advances another influential (and cognitivist) interpretation of
catharsis, arguing that catharsis, although it involves emotion, is in fact part of
30

a process of “ethical investigation” . Cynthia Freeland explains this cognitive
process that applies to the spectator: “when the audience responds to the
depicted events of a play with the emotions of pity and fear, they think and
learn, and they come to draw appropriate judgements concerning the moral
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issues and and problems represented in the play.”

31

Jonathan Lear, on the other

hand, provides the following alternative of interpretation:
It is this experience of the tragic emotions in an appropriately
inappropriate environment which, I think, helps to explain out the
experience of relief in the theatre. We imaginatively live life to the full,
but we risk nothing. The relief is thus not that of releasing pent-up
emotions per se, it is the relief of releasing these emotions in a safe
environment.32
It is not certain whether the Greeks thought of tragedy in these terms or if they
felt the relief that Lear is writing about. It can be argued that the experience of
the religious festivals, Lenaia and Dionysia, during which the plays were
performed, created a certain kind of euphoria and it seems that all actions
around the plays and the performances themselves were highly ritualized. Pity
and fear by themselves do not seem to constitute the pent-up emotions that
need to be released in a controlled environment. Pity is a tame, processed
emotion, while fear can be of many kinds and Aristotle does not specify which
one he refers to here. What is clear, however, is that Aristotle does not believe
in the immediacy of the actions that arouse emotions; for him, emotions are
contingent on surprise and sequencing. This is once more problematic when
looking at the occurrence of pain. In the excerpt from Philoctetes that I used as
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an example above, pain comes and goes unexpectedly, but in no specific order or
sequence. It is also impossible to know what exactly a spectator feels when
exposed to an enactment of a crisis such as Philoctetes’. It is reasonable,
therefore, to postulate that explaining the presence of pain in tragedy through
catharsis as purgation, relief or education is an attempt to medicate or hide it,
which is to do injustice to the author, the play and to the spectator as well.
1.3. Mimesis as the Analgesic Principle
In the Poetics, Aristotle’s work is that of classifying, explaining, taming
through logic and the victim is, in the extant part of the tract, tragedy; comedy
did not escape his scrutiny either, but the section dedicated to it has vanished.
For Aristotle, mimesis is what happens naturally and it is what differentiates
men from animals. Before the categorization of poetic mimesis, he explains:
People have an innate aptitude for representation from childhood, and in
this respect, they differ from other animals in being much more able to
imitate and learn from the first experiences by representing things and
33
also to find pleasure in the representations all things.
Therefore, mimesis is Aristotle’s representational lens—that through which
men must pass in order to attain their place in the hierarchy of nature. Not only
is mimesis necessary and inherent, since men are born with the instinct of
representing, but everything in nature can be represented, since (here) it is a
learning tool for children. So the spectrum of representation is limitless, but the
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genre does impose certain constraints (such as the ones mentioned in the
definition of tragedy and discussed above—objects, manner and means of
representation). Since all arts are mimetic in nature, it follows that everything
can be represented in art through mimesis. It follows that, with this concept
applied onto the dramatic genre, mimesis becomes a screen between world and
stage. If this idea is linked to the one discussed in the beginning of this chapter,
where I was arguing that mimesis can be seen as a corrective principle, through
which Aristotle tries to remedy that which is anomalous in nature, the
consequence is that mimesis becomes the screen through which nature gets
distilled, purified or adjusted when represented on stage. In the case of pain in
tragedy, then, mimesis acts like an analgesic principle, since, according to
Aristotle’s argument, pain has to go through a filter that tames it through
logical subjugation and shows it in such a way as to serve a chosen aesthetic,
ethical and pedagogic purpose. But in the moments of pain representation has
already been shifted through pain’s externalization and its projection onto an
object (Scarry’s analogical substantiation) through a compensation that is
necessary due to pain’s incommunicability. Just as discussed above at 1.1.3, in
the case of action and plot where, according to Aristotle’s system, it follows that
the action represented is doubly removed from its immediacy; here, when
discussing the effect that mimesis has when applied to pain, the cogent case can
be made that tragedy’s pain is twofold removed, once through substantiation
and one more time through the mimesis of the substantiation. The effect is that,
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through this double removal from pain by means of an artificial process of
mimesis, which gives tragic suffering a purpose in relation to the public,
whatever tragedy stirs, is alleviated; it is, therefore, safe for the spectator to be
affected by tragic pathos, since it is morally justified and intelligible from a
logical standpoint. Aristotle uses his system, in a way, to save himself and the
spectators of tragedy the uneasiness of being confronted with instances of pain
that cannot be accounted for directly. This logical explanation is compelling and
certainly does its job well as an analgesic, but it is artificial and contrived
because it is not found inside the tragic system, as Aristotle never looks at
tragedy other than to draw, out of context, examples that illustrate his system.
It is, instead, a system that is imposed from the outside with the purpose of
alleviating and offsetting the impact of being exposed to pain and suffering on
stage. The indignation that results from being confronted with suffering that
does not have a clear cause or meaning can be, as Nietzsche also notes in the
Genealogy of Morals, exasperating and can aggravate the impact of exposure:
What truly enrages people about suffering is not the suffering itself, but
the meaninglessness of suffering. But neither for the Christian, who has
interpreted into suffering an entire secret machinery for salvation, nor for
the naïve men of older times, who understood how to interpret all
suffering in relation to the spectator or to the person inflicting the
suffering, was there generally any such meaningless suffering. In order
for the hidden, undiscovered, unwitnessed suffering to be removed from
the world and for people to be able to deny it honestly, they were then
almost compelled to invent gods and intermediate beings at all levels,
high and low—briefly put, something that also roamed in hidden places,
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that also looked into the darkness, and that would not readily permit an
interesting painful spectacle to escape its attention.34
If meaningless suffering is what truly scares people, as Nietzsche argues,
Aristotle seems to come up with a system that integrates and explains suffering,
giving it a purpose and, thus, subduing it. However, Aristotle does not achieve
what he sets out to do because a logical system can only act as an analgesic for a
small kind of pain; when confronted with tragic pain, a logical mimetic system
is annihilated forthwith. Nietzsche correctly identifies here that “suffering in
relation to the spectator or to the person inflicting the suffering” may actually
be integrated into a system that gives it meaning, which is key in relation to
Aristotle’s system as well. But when taking into account the sufferer himself—
Philoctetes, Prometheus or Hercules—it is not a valid system anymore. Pain in
tragedy is unbearable; it completely dominates and subdues the character,
whose agency is taken away. Logical meaning, ideas or systems do not have the
capacity to remove one from the experience of extreme physical pain because
they cannot remove the sufferer from his world, as Nietzsche suggests in his
own attempt at integrating suffering. One may wonder if it is possible to do so
at all, even with the invention of gods that govern the world in its entirety, for it
seems that no matter what system is chosen to make sense of the physical
realm and impose order in the sufferer’s world, when pain is very intense, any
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such structure fails to intervene at the concrete level. However, although a
system may fail when the severity of the suffering is extreme, it could work in
other cases, when the sufferer is able to project himself outside of his immediate
surroundings and the suffering can be integrated as part of an assignment that
the subject can accept. Then it is possible, through equanimity and nonidentification with the physical body, to alleviate pain somewhat, but this is not
the case with the characters that experience pain in the tragedies that I am
discussing here. However, an alternative system to Aristotle’s mimetic model
can make sense and I will briefly discuss it below because it is consistent with
the Greek tragic context.
1.4. Ananke
When looking at the prevalence of ἀνάγκη 35 in tragedy, especially in the plays
that constitute the corpus of this thesis, there are two main issues: one relating
to scope and one to rendering. Martin Ostwald opens his analysis of the concept
in Thucydides by giving a general account of the term and the complications
that arise in its discussion:
…to substitute “necessity” or a cognate term for every occurrence of an
ἀνάγκη word will not do, since we cannot assume that the range of the
English term is coextensive with the Greek. English “necessity”, its
lexical definitions apart, has a number of different connotations. It may
be something foreordained by a divinity or predetermined by some
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transcendental and inscrutable force which man is powerless to resist. It
may be inherent in our human condition, such as the necessity to breathe,
eat, sleep, and eventually die; it may be thought of as inhering in the laws
of the physical universe, such as gravity or the motion of the earth and
the celestial bodies. It is usually regarded as inescapable, but there are
also instances in which it is—or can be—avoided. For example, the
payment of taxes is almost universally necessary; but what if a person
forgets to pay or pays less than his share? Nothing may happen if the
36
neglect remains undiscovered; much may happen if one is found out.
Whether ananke is abstract divine authority exercising autonomy over the
human sphere, personal compulsion, metaphysical necessity, natural order or
moral duty, it can be seen, especially in tragedy, as one of the main driving
forces of the plot. Out of the four moral norms, all personified into goddesses in
Greek mythology (Δίκη, the goddess of justice, Τύχη, goddess of chance, Άνάγκη,
goddess of necessity and Μοίρα, goddess of fate), ananke probably gets the least
attention in critical theory and it is often generalized as a metaphysical
necessity that relates, somehow, to the divine. Northorp Frye, who, other than
making the mistake of equating ananke with moira, provides a compelling
explanation for the internal workings of tragedy: “The Greek ananke or moira is
in its normal or pre-tragic form the internal balancing condition of life. It
appears as an external or antithetical necessity only after it has been violated
as a condition of life.”37 Frye looks at ananke as a force external to man and to
the tragic characters, which is only awakened and turned into a negative force
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that affects humans after the balance is disturbed. This, in turn, given the lack
of a clear context of reference for the term, can result in an a posteriori
application of the concept by critics. Nonetheless, there always remains in
tragedy a certain dynamic between choice and ananke, as agency is not ever
totally subdued other than, in fact, when dealing with pain. In one chapter
entitled Freedom, Fate and Justice from his excellent work Sweet Violence, the
Idea of the Tragic, Terry Eagleton underlines the constant pull between freedom
and predestined doom. He also brings up the Aristotelian ἁµαρτία, the error that,
in the Poetics, is linked with the concept of ananke:
Aristotle seems to contrast not freedom and necessity, but inner and
outer necessities. There is a dash of psychological determinism about his
thought. Indeed, if the hamartia or moral flaw which supposedly causes
tragedy is built into our temperament, and is less sin than innocent error,
how can we be held responsible for it?38
But the tragic character is held responsible for his own errors and, many times,
also for the errors of his ancestors, such as in Aeschylus’ Oresteia. The
discussion of ananke in Greek tragedy is a complex one and it would be a
compelling subject of an extended analysis. Here, I am using it as an example of
another concept whose workings apply to tragedy’s structure much better than
Aristotle’s mimesis. When looking at pain, ananke can certainly explain the
context of the characters’ sufferings and can also provide the meaning that
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could help the spectator make sense of the suffering. However, in the Greek
world it does not seem that a sort of transcendental contingency can elucidate or
give a coherent frame of reference that would assuage the suffering. Rather, one
can intuit an ambiguous system based on the dynamic between the human and
the divine, whose logistics are not always apparent and which cannot extricate
the sufferer from his physical world, where his pain takes place and precedence.
Such is the case in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, where the workings of ananke
are conspicuous. However, ananke cannot and does not act as an analgesic; nor
is the hero’s pain lessened in any way by the necessity of his punishment.
Rather, one can argue that it is exactly the opposite: his suffering is worsened
by the despotism of his torturer, Zeus, and by the obscure dynamic between
human justice and divine will.
Therefore, if one takes an honest look at tragedy, it is apparent that the
concepts Aristotle builds his conceptual system on, such as mimesis, hamartia,
plot and catharsis, only touch the surface of what tragedy really is. Pain in all
its forms, but especially in its very intense moments, still remains outside of the
perimeters of different systems that may try to explain it, give it meaning and
alleviate it. If, however, one is looking for a system that could incorporate it,
this is not to be found in Aristotle’s categorizations. Rather, a frame of
reference, such as ananke, is more appropriate. Pain seems to resist integration
in any such system and it is conceivable, in fact, that this is its main role in
tragedy: to go beyond elucidation, to be that which cannot be tamed.
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In this chapter I examined Aristotle’s systematic analysis of what he
renders as significant in tragic poetry and, most importantly, I investigated
whether his conceptual device, mimesis, has any relevance in what concerns
pain in tragedy. I found that Aristotle’s approach seems to be rather the work of
a pharmacologist, who tries to explain the symptoms, taken out of their poetic
context, then applies the logical bandage of his system of categorization. He is
not ever truthfully looking at tragedy as a medium that could have another
impact on one beyond a didactic and emotionally-spewing one. However, the
concept of ananke does advance several ideas, which help in the development of
the analysis of pain in the following chapters. First of all, it is apparent now
that an intricate network of forces, related to both the human and the divine,
determines the modus operandi in tragedy. Secondly, there is a question of what
forces are internal and external to the characters, especially to the ones
suffering pain and if this is at all relevant in the moment of intense pain.
Thirdly, and most importantly, is the question of the body, both the human and
the divine body and whether the pangs of pain and the workings of ananke
pertain to both categories. For now, however, it is safe to claim that, while
Aristotle does not benefit an analysis of pain in tragedy, engaging with his
categorical thought critically facilitates the subsequent investigation, since his
system is still greatly influential in the theory of tragedy.
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Chapter 2
The Body: Excretions and Extentions
If body is always deep but deepest at its surface.
Anne Carson
Since this thesis is an exploration of pain, I shall, in what follows,
determine what the confines of this experience are as it relates to the body. Pain
can have different facets and be intertwined with many things, such as disease,
emotional and mental suffering, insanity and a myriad of afflictions that throw
one out of the normal—a normal that is mostly a construct and highly
customizable, according to culture, nationality, sex, gender, age, social context
and so on. But the notion is usually applied to designate experiences pertaining
to one thing in particular: the body. This thesis looks specifically at physical
pain, namely pain experienced in the body; whether this pain is the projection of
another kind of suffering is a secondary issue in what concerns the analysis that
I am undertaking in this second chapter. Since the way tragedy is read
nowadays is highly influenced by the dualistic split between the body and soul, I
will look at the two dualist traditions that are most significant in how we frame
the body: the Platonic and the Cartesian one. Then I will compare these two
ways of rendering the body to what transpires from the Greek tradition
surrounding Greek tragedy, which is not rooted in the aforementioned split.
This account of reference frames pertaining to the body is by no means
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pretending to be an exhaustive one. In critical theory, the body is an object of
study on its own, especially given the relatively recent stream of gender theory.
For the purpose of this study, though, it is important to at least try to
comprehend the body in the context of Greek tragedy, in spite of the lack of a
clear framework that would ascertain the conjenctures. Tragedy, through the
centuries, has been passed down, rewritten and recontextualized multiple times
after its emergence in classical antiquity, and a current reading of tragedy
cannot happen in a void of knowledge. Nor is it entirely possible to reclaim the
Greeks’ perspective on the body without making sweeping generalizations based
on speculative assumptions, but some useful notions do, nevertheless, come to
light during the analysis, which will aid the advancement of the analysis in the
following chapter and in a future project. The attempt in this chapter, then, is to
be thorough in the study of pain in tragedy, while dealing with the impossibility
of giving an in-depth account of the history of the body in one chapter of a
thesis.
I found Jean Luc Nancy’s work entitled, quite adequately, Corpus, in
which he affixes the physical body to its extensions, while also bringing up the
important idea of the creation of the world through the articulation of what
happens in the body, which echoes Elaine Scarry’s last section of The Body in
Pain, a great starting point and guide through my abridged research while
trying to frame pain in relation to the body. At the centre of this work is the
idea of a body of God, which informs the tradition of discourse most employed in
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Western scholarship. Starting from the phrase hoc est enim corpus meus,
uttered by priests before the body and blood of Christ is imparted unto his
followers, his exploration forks out, at times only proposing complex arguments
related to aspects of the body in the world, at other times excogitating notions
that have a profound impact on long-established models. In this following
fragment, with the help of which I will start my inquiry, Nancy challenges the
notion of the body as object and as other, and deals specifically with the subject
at hand, the body touched by pain:
Thus the body in pain has its own portion of clarity, equal to everyone
else’s, and distinct. The limits of suffering provide intense evidence that a
body in pain, far from becoming an object, is an absolutely exposed
“subject.” Anyone who murders a body, relentlessly attacking the obvious,
cannot know, or wishes not to know, that he only renders the “subject” –
this hoc—more clear, more unmercifully clear, with each blow.39
By looking at the effect that pain has on the body, Nancy goes beyond the
division that renders the body as a closed, far-away entity; rather, he looks at
the body in pain as something that is undeniably real and present. The body, for
Nancy, is not a closed, finite thing, which collapses unto itself, but an opening
which is contingent on closure. Thus, the body is proven, manifestly, to be an
explicit element that, through its exposure to pain, which is a limit of sentience,
affirms itself in space; in fact, it becomes space (hoc). This fragment holds the
nucleus of a crucial idea for this thesis, namely that pain, instead of weakening
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and obscuring the suffering character and his extension, the text, exposes him,
asservating his rootedness in reality. It does so, however, only as an effect of
being exposed to its own limit and that of the character’s suffering. A limit,
moreover, is not a terminus point, although it does necessitate a certain kind of
demarcation against which it can be construed. Rather, it is a sort of rupture in
both reality and representation. An exposure to the limit is also an exposure to
the demarcation. Here, this exposure is useful in tracing back the steps that
lead, from a contemporarily-contextualized reading of tragedy, to a more
truthful experience of examination. This means that, instead of arguing against
the dualist tradition, it would be more valuable to use it in order to disclose the
limit in the body and text that pain exposes. Nancy also argues that this is a
necessary process in order to guard against the common mistake of artificially
treating the body as a unity:
We have to do justice to the ugly Cartesian dualism, Platonic and
Christian in origin, that opposes the soul to the body, because we won’t
respond to the injunction that comes to us in the form of a body if, as
contraband and in the name of a “unity” of soul and body, we put the soul
back in the place of the body. At any rate, when we speak about the body,
we are soon all too ready to reject, to “excrete” something (bad,
“material”...), by denouncing, for example, the “objectified body.” (…)
Machines are reputed to be inhuman, soulless, and bad for the body, even
though at the same time we’re quite content to use them. In wanting to
keep a “good,” “signifying” body, we reproduce the same schema of the
exclusion of the body by the soul. Through the appeal or injunction of
what falls under the name of body, we must first of all (…) restore
something of the dualism, in the precise sense that we have to think that
the body is not a monist unity (as opposed to the dualist vision), having
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the immediacy and self-immanence with which we earlier endowed the
soul.40
While in the first-quoted passage Nancy argues that the body, when exposed to
pain, is asserted as real and affirmed as a subject rather than as an object, he
subsequently warns against the deceitful attempt to replace the body with
something else (here: a soul), in order to keep it whole. Nancy takes the clue
from the dualist tradition, which I will look at in what follows, in order to create
space for the body itself, rather than erase it by replacing it with another,
righteous notion. He writes about the body as opposed to mass, which would be
impenetrable, but this is how the notion of body emerges when it is opposed to a
soul. Mass, for the discussion of which Nancy takes the clue from Aristotle’s
ὑ,οκεί/ενον (substance), is a thing that collapses unto itself, rather than the
body, which is affirmed and opens up when it is touched from outside of its
confines. The body, then, is articulated from the outside rather than delineated
and contained in the opposition with a notion of soul. Although Nancy does not
encourage staying within a tradition of dualism, he does take the clue from
Plato and Descartes (mainly) when he talks about different aspects of the body
and especially, he integrates the language that is used traditionally to talk
about the body in order to expose another notion, one that is not dogmatic. Since
flesh and skin are both parts of the body itself and its extensions, it follows that
the body is enunciated especially at its limit and the limit is touched through
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exposure to exteriority. The contention between interior-exterior is one that I
will come back to when discussing the ermitic space of Philoctetes, the wounded
hero. But for now, it is important to dab into the tradition that sustains the
notions of duality, particularly the body-soul dualism, in order to be able to
articulate what follows after—the Greek body that is full of hidden corners and
integrated in its context because of its own resistance to being framed by
notions that are imposed on it. In what follows, I will critically consider both the
Platonic and Cartesian dualist notions, since the two inform each other in
critical theory and the writing of the physical body. In addition to this, I will be
looking, throughout this chapter, at how pain informs and breaks these notions,
as well as briefly discussing the notion of the divine body and how this relates to
tragedy.
2.1 Dualism: Descartes
Thus, a proper investigation of the frame of reference concerning the body
within the context of ancient tragedy must compare the Greeks’ notion of the
body—both human and divine with both the Cartesian and Platonic ideas. In
his work on mind-body relationships (which is to say mainly in the Meditations),
Descartes suggests a dualistic solution. According to him, although the mind
and body are joined within the same person, they are treated as separate and
often divergent entities in reference to one another. In the Sixth Meditation,
Descartes argues that the body and mind are composed of essentially different
substances and, while the mind is what constitutes being, the body is merely an
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extension of it. Having build, during the first five Meditations, the idea that one
cannot be sure of the existence of physical extensions of the mind, such as
things that pertain to the senses, which can easily trick one into assessing
objects one way or another, in the Sixth Meditation he concludes that the mind
is the sole indivisible substance, through which he can penetrate the body:
For this reason, from the fact that I know that I exist and that at the
same time I judge that obviously nothing else belongs to my nature or
essence except that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my
essence consists entirely in my being a thinking thing. And although
perhaps (or rather, as I shall soon say, assuredly) I have a body that is
very closely joined to me, nevertheless, because on the one hand I have a
clear and distinct idea of myself, insofar as I am merely a thinking thing
and not an extended thing, and because on the other hand I have a
distinct idea of a body, insofar as it is merely an extended thing and not a
thinking thing, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body and
can exist without it.41
Descartes, then, sees the body and mind as a unit, although the mind itself can
exist on its own and is given higher status in the system than its extension in
the physical world. The body, however, is separate from what constitutes the
being, which is just a “thinking thing.” In this division, it becomes apparent that
the mind is constructed in opposition to the body, although the two are joined.
Moreover, for Descartes, thinking (as in “understanding”) is also different
from “imagining,” and it seems that the latter is associated with things
experienced through the senses, which get imprinted in the imagination by
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means of memory.42 The continuation of the argument in the Sixth Meditation is
important because it addresses exactly the issue of the sensations and
particularly that of pain, so the following account of it is relevant here. The first
part of his inquiry deals with assessing the things that previously he took for
granted because he had experienced them through his senses. Such is the belief
that the body with its parts defines his being, as well as being directed to act or
behave a certain way by sensations and the needs based on those sensations,
which Descartes calls “appetites,” as well as emotions. He makes a difference
between the things he experiences internally, such as the ones mentioned
before, and what he experiences externally, such as: “light, colors, odors, tastes,
and sounds, on the basis of whose variety [he] distinguished the sky, the earth,
the seas, and the other bodies, one from the other.”43 Moreover, he makes an
important distinction between the external things in themselves and the
qualities that he senses based on his interaction with the different objects,
pointing out that he “could not sense any object unless it was present to a sense
organ.”44 This is relevant because he explains that he is tricked to believe that
the external objects are real, since what he perceives when he is exposed to the
empirical existence of the world is more vivid than what he can imagine (as if
this imagining can happen in a vacuum). He goes on to argue that experiencing
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things thus made him believe that his thoughts developed afterwards, based on
sensations, since he experienced them first. His sensations also made him
develop the belief that he was rooted in his own body, since he reacted to his
sensations and had grown accustomed to it. By comparison, the objects external
to his body were not sending him any such signals. Descartes further postulates
that the reason for his reaction to different sensations, such as pain and hunger,
is directed by nature and habit. In the second part of the argument, he explains
how he came to question all these convictions he previously held. Invoking the
laws of optics (further away objects seem smaller than they actually are), he
comes to realize that the “external senses” are not to be trusted. The “internal
sensations”, although experienced very intensely (“For what can be more
intimate than pain?”45) are harder for Descartes to dismiss, although he does so
by the end of the section. After invoking the phenomenon of nervous shadowing
(illustrated with the example of the sensation that is felt in a severed limb), he
goes on to argue:
The first was that everything I ever thought I sensed while awake I could
believe I also sometimes sensed while asleep, and since I do not believe
that what I seem to sense in my dreams comes to me from things external
to me, I saw no reason why I should hold this belief about those things I
seem to be sensing while awake. The second was that, since I was still
ignorant of the author of my origin (or at least pretended to be ignorant of
it), I saw nothing to prevent my having been so constituted by nature that
I should be mistaken even about what seemed to me most true.46
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Therefore, because he experiences sensations in his sleep as well, he concludes
that he cannot trust his senses when away, since they “trick” him into believing
that what produces sensations in his sleep is as real as concrete physical reality.
Moreover, he does not find a counterargument to his dismissal of the world of
senses as a false one, although he talks about a past when he did not completely
acknowledge the presence of God and His reason for making Descartes believe
falsely in a reality that might not be reliable. When he brings God into the
argument, the whole discussion changes since, instead of having a polemical
inquiry between Descartes and his own body, a third entity that has dominance
over both is brought into the investigation. Thus he postulates that he is defined
by his faculty of thinking and, continuing from this, that his mind and the
qualities of the objects he perceives are made of a different “substance,” with the
one in which his body exists being a “corporeal and extended substance,”47 from
which he infers that, since God, who has dominance over the world, could not
simply deceive him into believing that the corporeal things exist, therefore they
do, indeed, exist. The extension of this argument is advanced in what follows:
There is nothing that this nature teaches me more explicitly than that I
have a body that is ill disposed when I feel pain, that needs food and
drink when I suffer hunger or thirst, and the like. Therefore, I should not
doubt that there is some truth in this. By means of these sensations of
pain, hunger, thirst, and so on, nature also teaches that I am present in
my body not merely in the way a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am
most tightly joined and, so to speak, commingled with it, so much so that
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I and the body constitute one single thing. For if this were not the case,
then I, who am only a thinking thing, would not sense pain when the
body is injured; rather, I would perceive the wound by means of the pure
intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight whether anything in his ship
is broken.48
So, since nature is an extension of God, sensations are a way of guiding the
thinker as to what he (both mind and body) needs in order to survive (although
the survival part is never discussed, but only hinted at, in the Meditations).
This teleological argument addresses the union of the body and mind/soul and
developing a notion of being, of ego. What Descartes seems to be doing here is,
as I’ve stated previously, to reach the physical body through the mind; however,
he relates to the physical body in a similar way than he does to outside objects.
The only means of differentiation seem to be the senses. The perception of
things (especially that of pain) is what is of interest for this study, but before
looking at this, it is important to delve into what constitutes the ego for
Descartes. Nancy has a different approach, expounded below, to the issue,
which I find worth quoting and discussing, since his conclusion in the following
excerpt advances the same exterior-interior dialectic that I was discussing
previously:
For Descartes himself, the famous ego (which I’m now using in place of
the soul) is only ego by virtue of being outside itself, by touching the wax.
And therefore, to put it in an arrogant way, I’m claiming to show that, for
Descartes, the res cogitans is a body. Descartes knows this very well. At
this point, we should develop everything he says about the union of the

48

Descartes, Meditations, 45.

52

soul and the body, which is evidence as strong as that of the ego sum
itself. Ego is being outside with reference to the ego. Ego is also being a
body. A body is sensing, but sensing such that there’s no sensing that
wouldn’t be a “sensing one’s self.”
To sense, we have to sense ourselves sensing-this is also a proposition of
Aristotle that we find in the On the Soul. Body means very precisely the
soul that feels it’s a body. Or: the soul is the name of the sensing of the
body. We could say it with other pairs of terms: the body is the ego that
senses itself to be other than ego. (…) The formula that sums up this
thought would be: the inside, which senses it is outside.49
The ego, as Nancy argues, is the projection of the body, which is reached
through its opposition to the soul. The difference between Descartes’ mind and
soul is another discussion that exceeds the purpose of this study; from here on, I
will use the term “soul,” since this ties into the next conceptual system that will
be examined in this chapter, namely Plato’s. Although the body and soul are in
a relation of duality, they are joined, forming the ego, which, according to
Nancy, is also a projection of the body. The physical body itself is reached
through the soul by means of the senses. Therefore, only by means of an exterior
projection is the body able to reach itself. To bring pain into this equation would
mean to discuss how the body would be reached through its projection, the soul,
by means of pain. However, intense pain would mean, most of the time, the
dissolution of the opposition, as the cognitive act would be annulled. If pain is
the limit of sensing, then the touching of the physical self, which is done at the
edge between the body and its extension, is either obstructed or reinforced. It is
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obstructed in the case of the dissolution of the ability of the body to form a
projection through which it can reach itself and it is reinforced when this
projection on the exterior can still be done by the intensification of the sensation
and the assurance of the existence of the physical body. In either case, the body
becomes, once more, exposed, while the division between the body and the soul
would most likely actualize the existence of the body instead of providing an
escape mechanism through which the body would be ejected. In the concrete
instance of the suffering tragic characters, the body is still seen and felt from
the outside for the most part, with the exception of one scene in Philoctetes,
when the pain reaches an upper limit of sentience and the character is muted.
Also, this is the case in the Trachiniae, when Heracles’ only effort is to beg for
someone to kill him, so that, through the disappearance of the body, his pain
stops as well. Otherwise, in Prometheus Bound, for example, pain is the point of
entry into the body and the awareness of the suffering body, in this case, is the
main objective of Zeus’ punishment.
Reexamining Descartes’ solution at this point, it appears that dualism
becomes problematic especially when he brings the third entity into the
argument, namely God. The argument that internal and external sensations,
including pain, are God’s (or nature’s, which is subordinated to and an
extension of God) way of letting the mind know to govern the body seems to be
an artificial way of accounting for the gap that was previously created, when he
argued that it is difficult for the mind to account for the existence of the body.

54

So he is aided in the joining of the two—body and its projection—by a
teleological explanation.
In his final treatise, The Passions of the Soul, Descartes addresses the
issue of the union between the body and the soul once more, by creating a
system where the passions (six in number: admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy
and sadness50) are the elements through which the soul and body communicate.
The passions produce sensations in the body by means of which the soul gets to
know how to attend to the body. Both passions and sensations are processes
that are rooted in the physical body and through which the union of the soul
and body is created. The Passions of the Soul is a continuation of the argument
Descartes starts in the Meditations and its bulk is busy with classifying the
passions. This work once more makes use of the Cartesian method of
conceptualization and it does so by imposing a system that is designed to make
total sense of nature. If Descartes’ definition of passions as stated in art. 27 of
The Passions of the Soul establishes that the passions also play a role of
intermediation between the rational sphere and the perceptions of the soul,
especially since they are also “caused, maintained and strengthened by some
movements of the spirits.”51 Pain challenges this idea since it is immanent and
it actualizes the body; Descartes’ conceptual intermediation may seem
convenient, but ultimately it is, in intention, a logical panacea.
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In Descartes’ system, the rational act (cogito) is posited as the central
notion—the subject of the logical proposition—whereas the ego is a derivative
notion, subordinate in relation to the cogito function. Descartes’ standpoint,
then, is that of the examiner of the rational process, not that of the empirical
analyst. This position is fundamentally divergent from the tragic one, where the
concepts neither intermediate between realms, nor between the characters and
their experiences, or between the spectators and the stage. Descartes’ system is,
admittedly, the most distant in approach from the tragic one. However, this
system is important to keep in sight, especially since it is the result of a mode of
conceptualization that starts in classical antiquity in Greece, emerging only one
century later than the inception of the tragic tradition. This other system of
thought, which I will discuss subsequently, is the Platonic one.
2.2 Plato’s Dualism
Within the ancient context, by fifth century BC, a new notion of the soul
had been elaborated (most notably in Plato’s Phaedo and, to a more limited
extent, in the Republic)—that of an immortal soul, which man must, through
different methods, detache from the body, which is transitory and perishable, in
order to purify and attain a higher state of existence52. In the Phaedo, the
dialogue comprising Socrates’ death by hemlock, Plato sets the ground for his
theory of Forms, which will be further developed in the Phaedrus and the

52

Vernant 20.

56

Republic. Since most of the arguments in the Phaedo have as starting point the
discussion concerning Socrates’ impending death, they are centered upon the
condition of the soul. The main three arguments are all concerned with the
soul’s immortality, but the one I will be looking at here is the last one, the
argument from affinity53, which deals directly with the soul’s relation to the
body through the senses. The tail of the argument holds the following discussion
about the purification of the soul through the practice of philosophy:
“I will tell you,” he said. “For lovers of knowledge,” he said, “know that
when philosophy takes over their soul, it is absolutely bound on all sides
and glued to the body and is forced to contemplate existing things
(realities) through the body as through a prison, not the things
themselves as they are, and is wallowing in nothing but ignorance; and
the soul, looking down, sees that the most terrible thing about the
imprisonment is the fact that it springs from the lust of flesh, just so that,
exceedingly, one is his own assistant in his incarceration. Then I say that
the lovers of knowledge know that philosophy, when it takes over the soul
when it is in this state, gently encourages it and attempts to unbind it,
pointing out that perception through the eyes, as through the ears as
through all other senses is full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from
these, except in so far as their use is necessary, and encouraging it to
collect and gather itself within itself, and to trust nothing other than
itself and its own understanding of abstract existence; and to contemplate
that there is no truth other than in that which it sees otherwise and
which is such that it varies according to the different things in which it
appears, since everything of that kind is visible and captured by the
senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is not perceivable and
apprehended by the mind. Now the soul of the philosopher truly reasons
that it must not withstand this release, and as such, it stands removed

Plato, Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903),
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0169%3Ate
xt%3DPhaedo%3Apage%3D5, 78b-84b.

53

57

from pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears, so much as it can do so,
reckoning that whenever anyone has violent pleasures or fears or griefs
or lusts he suffers from them not solely what one might suppose, such as
illness or loss of money spent for his lusts, but he suffers the greatest and
most extreme evil and does not take it into account.”
“What is this evil, oh Socrates?” said Cebes.
“The evil is that the soul of all man is forced, when it takes pleasure
exceedingly or is grieved by anything, to believe that the thing from
which the emotion came is very vivid and very real, but it is not so: these
objects are mostly the visible ones, is it not so?”
“By all means.”
“And when this happens, is the soul not exceedingly tied down by the
body?”
“How so?”
“Because each pleasure or pain fastens it down as with a nail to the body
and fastens it on and makes it corporeal, so that it deems that the things
are true which the body says are true. For because it has the same beliefs
and pleasures as the body it is constrained to assume the same practices
as well and a way of life, and can never leave in purity to Hades, but
must always go away polluted by the body; and so it falls down right
away into another body again and grows into it, just like a seed that is
implanted. Therefore it has no portion in the communion with the divine
54
and physically clean and unique.”
Here, the opposition between ψυχὴ (soul) and σώµα (body) is rooted in the
contention that the territory of the body is the antithesis of “the divine and pure
and absolute,” which is the realm of the Forms—purified, ideal concepts. The
soul, before the process of purification, exists in between these two planes and
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its only chance of accessing a higher state and continuing its existence in the
realm of the Forms is through the practice of philosophy—so through the mind,
which trains one to be detached from the illusions created by the body, through
the senses. Pleasure and pain, which are here given as examples of evils that
keep the soul attached to the body, belong to the world of the corporeal
(σωµατοειδῆ), whereas the world of the soul, which it has to work to recognize by
cutting ties with the physical realm, is one of the divine (θείου), purity, in the
sense of cleanliness (καθαροῦ) and simplicity or undividedness (µονοειδοῦς).
Existence in the world of the contaminated body is seen as something that one
would definitely avoid (at 84b Socrates goes on to classify the animal bodies of
the reincarnated souls based on their moral wrongdoings and misconducts, such
as donkeys for the egregious souls and hawks for the unjust ones). What is
valuable to recognize here is also that the emotions, although capable of having
such a great influence on the soul, are rooted in the senses, which are deceitful
inasmuch as they give the impression that the objects perceived through them
are true. However, this is not the deceitfulness that Descartes mentions in the
Sixth Meditations, when he argues that the objects perceived by the senses are
smaller or larger than they appear in reality. Rather, Socrates is arguing that
the things observed through the senses are not to be trusted because they are
perceived through the body “as through prison bars” and they are only shadows
of the realities of the realm of Forms. The soul is still immortal even if it does
not go through the purification, but it does not have access to the truth and it
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lives in the world of projections.
It is important to establish the similarities between the two positions,
that of Descartes and that advanced by Plato, as they together lay the
foundation of a position that is usually taken as a priori in pain studies, namely
the projection of the self outside of the physical world. On this particular topic,
Sarah Broadie writes:
Both philosophers argue that we consist of something incorporeal,
whether one calls it ‘mind’ or ‘soul’, which for the time being is somehow
united with a body that is part of the physical world. Both identify the
self, the ‘I’, with the incorporeal member of this alliance. Both hold that
my mind or soul will survive the demise of the body (…), which in turn is
present to me through its members’ bodies. Both may be understood as
holding that the mind or soul can exist altogether independently of body,
though Plato may have changed position on this point. Both are
concerned with the immortality of the soul.55
Moreover, both philosophers build systems that place the body in a lesser,
deceitful and impure realm, while the soul’s attachment to it is assisted by the
senses. The division between the body and soul is a prerequisite for both
systems, but, while Descartes develops a theory of passions, using the concepts
to create a unity between the body and soul, Plato regards all emotions as κακόι
(evil). Plato, moreover, puts emphasis on a process of separation between soul
and body, which is necessary before a definitive segregation between the two
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can take place. The soul is, in nature, indestructible and eternal and has the
aptitude of elevating itself. Thus, this system is fundamentally a transcendental
one, while for Descartes, the soul’s union with the body and the ego’s rapport
with God is established a priori conception. Hendrik Lorenz has it that for the
Greeks, the soul is “standardly thought and spoken of (…) as the distinguishing
mark of living things, as something that is the subject of emotional states and
that is responsible for planning and practical thinking, and also as the bearer of
such virtues as courage and justice.”56 It is apparent that in both systems the
corporeal realm is polluted and the desirable thing for the human being is to at
least be able to distinguish between what is bodily and what rational or abstract
and belongs to the world of the soul and the divine.
Both philosophers use strong scornful language when describing the body
(Plato more so than Descartes), so reading these theoretical texts next to the
tragic ones exposes the discrepancy between the two approaches. Plato’s and
Descartes’ theoretical systems advance concepts that put the body at a distance,
so that one can mediate between different realms and entities. Thus, the body is
never actualized, although, as I was arguing in the first pages of this chapter
with the aid of Nancy’s Corpus, one can meet the body at its limit between the
physical realm and the cogito act or between the corporeal and the Ideas in
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Plato’s terms. Considering the soul-body dualism here is not meant to advance
an antithetical idea of oneness because this would not necessarily help in
approaching the pained body in tragedy, but because it is valuable to recognize
that the manufacturing of conceptual systems is inconsistent with both the
tragic sphere and with the posture that the body is in when experiencing
intense pain. After dealing with Aristotle’s system of classification, a look at
Plato’s and Descartes’ synthetic schemes facilitates a process of conceptual
deconstruction, and exposes the need to set these systems aside when
approaching the core of the issue: pain in tragedy.
The notion of the body in tragedy does not to spring from soul-body
dualism; corporeality in this context seems to be contiguous to the archaic
manner of positing the body, which, as Fulton explains, is not rooted in a split:
The fact is that in the archaic period Greek “corporeity” still does not
acknowledge a body/soul distinction, nor does it establish a radical break
between the natural and supernatural. Man’s corporeality also includes
organic realities, vital forces, psychic activities, divine inspiration or
influxes. The same word can refer to these various domains. On the other
hand, there is no term that designates the body as an organic unity,
which supports the individual in the multiplicity of his vital and mental
functions.57
This view of the body can likewise be applied to how the body is represented in
tragedy. Especially in the cases of the suffering heroes of the three tragedies I
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am discussing in the following chapter, the body is represented through its
parts or extensions: in the case of Prometheus by his chains and liver, in
Philoctetes’ case by his foot, wound and bloody bandages and in Heracles’ case
by the poisoned cloak and his pained limbs. It is true that this occurs in the text
also due to the characters’ exposure to pain, which splits the attention and
directs it to the spot in the body where it occurs or to the object that provokes it,
but this would not be expressed thus in a text which belongs to a tradition
rooted in the soul-body division. The prevalence of pain in tragedy signals the
poets’ preoccupation with the experience of pain and with what can be induced
or gained by the public through the exposure to it. It is also possible that the
tragic poets were aware of the ideological current that advanced the body-soul
division and were addressing the issue through the representation of pain on
stage. Their understanding of the mechanisms of pain, incontestable given
especially its primacy in the tragedies I am commenting on in the third chapter,
challenges through simple exposure any such system, for in pain, any mindbody division, no matter how firmly pre-established a Platonic or Cartesian
system of conceptualization might be, is shaken, as Drew Leder also argues:
…such an account is profoundly challenged by the experience of pain. For
in pain we find the unity of the mental and corporeal. The bodily
sensation is intimately intertwined with an emotional and existential
meaning. This unity has a linguistic representation: the word “pain” itself
can be used to describe not only physical, but emotional or cognitive
suffering.” It is not only the unity of mind and body that pain reveals, but
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also another duality: between the patient, or the one in pain, and the
external world.58
Leder discusses here the effect that pain has on the body in terms of a “unity,”
which is not a notion that I advance in relation to tragedy. However, the more
important idea that transpires from this passage is the fact that in instances of
intense pain, the mind-body or soul-body division ceases to make sense. If, then,
one deems the soul as the purified extension of the body and the ideal version of
man, pain reminds one that such a projection is inconsistent with the human
being in its natural surroundings. Through the raw experience of pain, the body
is once more actualized, it becomes real and present—a purification of the body
in opposition to the soul. Ancient tragedians, it seems, are well aware of this
fact and instead of employing a system that purifies the soul and does not allow
it to be exposed to the pain that “nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it
on and makes it corporeal,”59 they expose the body, bringing it in focus and
positing it as subject through pain.
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Chapter 3:
The Limits of Pain: Pain in Prometheus Bound, Philoctetes and
Trachiniae
Never has Zeus, the king of all things,
granted to mortals life without pain;
but grief and happiness come
to every man in his turn,
like the circling paths of the Bear.
Sophocles, Trachiniae

This chapter offers several interpretations of pain in the three plays of the
corpus through a hermeneutical method of analysis in light of the notion of
limit. These readings build on concepts that I discussed in the previous two
chapters, where I showed why it is necessary to liberate oneself from the burden
of a mimetic and a dualist conceptual system when approaching the ancient
tragic tradition. Although the choice of a hermeneutical method of analysis may
seem overly ambitious here, this approach is chosen deliberately as means of
countering the above-mentioned systems of conceptualization. Tying in with a
tradition of interpretation that antedates Platonic philosophy, hermeneutical
analysis puts the interpreter in the position of “a translator, a mediator, who
uses his linguistic knowledge to make intelligible what is not understood, what
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is no longer understood.”60 Peter Szondi’s Introduction to Literary Hermeneutics
outlines a tradition of literary hermeneutics in juxtaposition with philosophical
hermeneutics, which gained theoretical ground in the twentieth century, under
the influence of Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer, who are building on a shift in
hermeneutics initiated by Romantic German philosopher and theologian
Friedrich Schleiermacher. In his work Hermeneutics and Criticism, making a
switch from theological hermeneutics to general textual hermeneutics,
Schleiermacher lays down the rules for a modern hermeneutical method,
underlying the relation between hermeneutics, criticism and grammar:
Hermeneutics and criticism, both philological disciplines, both theories,
belong together, because the practice of one presupposes the other. The
former is generally the art of understanding particularly the written
discourse of another person correctly, the latter the art of judging
correctly and establishing the authenticity of texts and parts of texts from
adequate evidence and data. (…) In the same way as hermeneutics and
criticism belong together, so too do they both belong together with
grammar.61
This passage opens the ground for the two main axes of hermeneutical inquiry:
the grammatical the psychological. The former dimension of interpretation, the
grammatical one, building on the notion of the sensus litteralis of ancient
hermeneutics, through which the hermeneutician seeks to find the meaning of
the words that form the text, comprises the famous hermeneutical circle, which
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Schleiermacher introduces thus: “[c]omplete knowledge is always in this
apparent circle, that each particular can only be understood via the general, of
which it is a part, and vice-versa. And every piece of knowledge is only scientific
if it is formed in this way.”62 Therefore, in order to properly understand the text
according to Schleiermacher’s grammatical method, the hermeneutician must
be prepared to see both the historical and cultural context of the text and its
textual details at the level of the word—a move between the two is necessary for
an authentic interpretation.63 The psychological axis of hermeneutical
interpretation, namely the psychological one, is famous for its often-criticized
concept of authorial intent, which Schleiermacher explains thus:
The task is also to be expressed as follows, to understand the utterance at
first just as well and then better than its author. For because we have no
immediate knowledge of what is in him, we must seek to bring much to
consciousness that can remain unconscious to him, except to the extent to
which he himself reflectively becomes his own reader.64
This type of interpretation is an effort to understand and bring to light what the
author meant, but it also a divinatory practice for the hermeneutician, meaning
a method “in which one, so to speak, transforms oneself into the other person
and tries to understand the individual element directly.”65 I am choosing to give
an account of Schleiermacher’s set of rules for hermeneutical analysis not
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because I will follow them closely, but because his method ties in with the
ancient one of divination—the interpretation of the Oracle’s message. This
method, in turn, is also more in line with the practice of rhetoric, which
Schleiermacher also links to the hermeneutical method: “The belonging together
of hermeneutics and rhetoric consists in the fact that every act of understanding
is the inversion of a speech-act, during which the thought which was the basis of
the speech must become conscious.”66 The rhetorical tradition, which Plato
slanders in his dialogues, is, therefore, rooted in the speech act and grants the
space necessary for an interpretation of the hermeneutical type, as opposed to
Plato’s system, which does not. I choose to align myself, then, to this tradition
when exercising a hermeneutical methodology not in its strictly
Schleiermachian sense, but rather in its original denotation, indicated by the
word’s etymological root: ἑρµηνεύς—interpreter, expounder.
Interpreting texts “in their totality” and doing so in relation to only one
instance or concept, such as pain, is different in what concerns the
hermeneutical process—there is, simultaneously, a process of contextualization
of the moment itself in the play, the play in the cultural and historical
circumstance, but also constantly connecting the pain in the text to human pain
in general. Because pain is universal, the last part of the task is made easier; it
is, in fact, one of the main reasons for its inclusion in tragedy and for the
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attention granted it in the three plays that I am analyzing. There is, in tragedy
and elsewhere, a singular pain—it differs in causes and effects, but the core is
always the same.
Not only is this hermeneutical analysis focused on the notion of pain, but,
in what follows, I will be framing the notion of pain in relation to that of the
limit. This notion was already discussed to some extent in the second chapter, in
relation to Nancy’s contention that through pain, a limit is reached which
exposes the body as a subject. Besides discussing the concrete limits of space,
sentience and language in relation to pain, I am also exposing the ways in
which pain in tragedy tests various limits and constitutes a point of entry into
the body, through which another dimension is accessed. There is, indeed, an
esoteric implication in this contention, which cannot be avoided when talking
about a tradition such as the tragic one after connecting it to pre-Socratic
thought. Although one cannot establish with certainty what the relationship
between the public, stage and the spiritual message of the tragedies was in fifth
century BC, a hermeneutic understanding, while keeping track of the context of
the plays, is certainly more valuable than a purely historical or philological
reading, which would align the tragic tradition to a Platonic and Aristotelian
one, draining it of all intensity.
I also want to advance the idea of pain as the limit of life—the moment
when the sufferer can come as close as possible to death while still alive. This
type of exposure would be, for the Greeks, both a moment of purification and
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one of illumination. About purification in relation to the fire element, Peter
Kingsley writes in his book Ancient Philosophy, Mystery and Magic, which had
significant influence on this project in its developing stages, writes: “[t]he idea
of fire as purifying—and immortalizing—became so deeply imbedded in the
consciousness of the Greeks that even at their most facetious they were unable
to escape it.”67 I am using the same idea in my analysis, while replacing fire
with pain. Seeing pain as the purifying element would take the physical body
out of the action-object relationship it is in Plato’s system, when the argument
of the purification of the body and the detachment of the soul from the body is
advanced, such as in Phaedo. Instead, pain in tragedy is imminent, while its
circumstances and consequences cannot be controlled or organized into a set of
rules. With these ideas in the background, I will start the foray into the texts of
the three plays of the corpus.
3.1 Prometheus Bound
One play where fire and pain are connected in a rapport of cause-and-effect
is Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, where the pro-Olympian god is tied to a rock
in distant land, in Scythia, Central Asia, a land of the ξένοι (foreigners) as
Kratos’ opening lines describe:
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earth’s remotest part we come, to the Scythian land, an untrodden
69

solitude.

Here, since the play is with and about immortals, the limit is defined through
space and the space is an extension of Prometheus’ situation and suffering. I
will discuss the relevance of a space of isolation in relation to pain as it appears
in Philoctetes, but it is important to note that, since this is the opening to
Prometheus Bound, the entrance into the situation of pain is done through
space, by carrying out Prometheus’ bounding outside the city, in a deserted
place where the sufferer cannot exercise agency or relate to anything of
importance in a social context. The space of solitude, untrodden and desolate
(ἄβατον) is a reflection of the hero’s suffering, but also, in the case of
Prometheus, the place of torture.
3.1.1 Godly Bodies
The story of Parometheus’ wrongdoings is told in reverse: in the opening
scene the hero is already being punished by Zeus’ intermediants, Bia and
Kratos (Force and Power) for crimes that have been commited previously.
Before advancing, it is important to note that, while until now I discussed the
human body in the thought of Plato, Descartes and the pre-Socratics, here the
punished one is a god—immortal, but still vulnerable—hero. In his essay Dim
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Body, Dazzling Body, Jean-Pierre Vernant poses an important question: “The
body of gods. How does this expression pose a problem for us? Can gods who
have two bodies—antropomorphic gods like those of the ancient Greeks—really
be considered gods?”70 In the case of Prometheus Bound, this is an essential
question, since Prometheus is a powerful god, yet susceptible to punishment
and torture by Zeus, the newly appointed ruler of Olympus. Prometheus’ myth
is given a lot of importance and lines in Hesiod’s Theogony as well (almost one
hundred lines), where he is responsible for both bestowing fire on the mortals
and for their misfortunes, sent to them as punishment by Zeus through the
deceptive and unfortunate Pandora. Prometheus is, in Hesiod, in between the
two worlds (the human and the divine) and between two roles (that of
benefactor and wrongdoer), but in Prometheus Bound, he is not associated with
Pandora, so he is a lawbreaker only according to Zeus’ system of justice. This
god-human duality in terms of the body seems to resemble the body-soul one in
Plato and Descartes, but when considered in light of the pre-Socratics, such as
Xenophones, whose take on the matter Vernant discusses in his essay, the
distinction is defined in other terms than the dualist ones:
In order to traverse the gulf separating god and man, Xenophanes is not
led to oppose the corporeal to the noncorporeal, to an immateriality, a
pure Spirit; for him, it is enough to acknowledge the contrast between the
constant and the changing, the immutable and the mutable, the
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perfection of that which remains eternally accomplished in the plenitude
of itself, and the incompleteness and imperfection of that which is
divided, dispersed, partial, transitory, perishable.71
If the fundamental difference between the divine and human body is
immortality and permanence on the divine side, then Prometheus’ position as
victim of Zeus’ unrelenting retribution in Prometheus Bound addresses exactly
this issue: the suffering of an immortal god, who is not in danger of dying, but is
still exposed to pain. Prometheus’ pain does not seem to be alleviated in any
way by the fact that he is a god. In fact, he repeatedly refers, complaining about
his treatment by Zeus and the abuse that he, himself a god, is subjected to for a
deed that, to him, seems perfectly ethical. Moreover, he expresses that his
immortality is amplifying his pain (by the thought of an eternal pain, that
cannot be ended by death) when he is confronted with Io, who is a mortal:
Io
What gain have I then in life? Why did I not hurl myself straightaway
from this rugged rock, so that I was dashed to earth and freed from all
my sufferings? It is better to die once and for all than linger out all my
days in misery.
Prometheus
Ah, you would hardly bear my agonies to whom it is not foredoomed to
die; for death would have freed me from my sufferings. But now no limit
to my tribulations has been appointed until Zeus is hurled from his
72
sovereignty.
For Io, there is still the option of death, which she can choose, so her agency is
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not completely severed. Prometheus, however, does not have such a luxury. He
is thus in a position which demands the tragic spectator’s attention, who can
empathize with his suffering, which makes him more pitiful than a human. But
still, the question remains of Zeus’ authority, who makes a point by punishing
Prometheus in order to assert his power. The play seems to have an implicit
subversive thread running through it, but in terms of the notion of pain, it
appears that there is a process that Prometheus has to go through in order to
authenticate Zeus’ system of law in the two worlds, which he has disturbed, but
also to expose the fact that inexhaustible vital energy, attemporality and sacred
existence are not tested by death, but by pain. The limit that exposes the body,
human or divine, is not that of life, but that of pain—here inflicted through
torture, isolation, oppression and the removal of agency.
3.1.2 Torture
Thus, the imposition of order, substantiated through torture, is what makes
pain for Prometheus undeniably concrete. This is also made clear from the
beginning of the play, in Kratos’ order to Hephaestos:
And now, Hephaestus, yours is the charge to observe the mandates laid
upon you by the Father—to clamp this miscreant upon the high craggy
rocks in shackles of binding adamant that cannot be broken. For your
own flower, flashing fire, source of all arts, he has purloined and
bestowed upon mortal creatures. Such is his offence; for this he is bound
to make requital to the gods, so that he may learn to bear with the
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sovereignty of Zeus and cease his man-loving ways.

Zeus’ punishment is carried through Kratos, Bia and Hephaestus, all
immortals, and, while the first two are willing participants in the torture,
Hephaestus is reluctant and fearful. The language used by Kratos to describe
Prometheus, especially the pejorative λεωργόν (a villan) establishes the
structure of torture from the first lines. As Elaine Scarry notes, there are two
aspects of torture, both of which are exemplified here, in Kratos’ command,
namely a physical act and a verbal one.74 In this example, the action of inflicting
pain is expressed through the verb ὀχµάσαι (infinitive aorist of ὀχµάζω—to grip,
bind; also used in relation to binding animals in Euripides) and through the
emphatic description of the instrument of torture: ἀδαµαντίνων δεσµῶν ἐν
75

ἀρρήκτοις πέδαις

(unbroken fetters of adamant chains). The verbal part of

torture is carried out through the reiteration of the reason for the torture and
the reinforcement of Zeus’ authority. Prometheus, who is silent throughout the
first part, where a reluctant Hephaestus is binding him, is subjected to the
torture without being interrogated directly. This annuls his voice, but also
implies his lack of direct interaction with the agents of power—he is not allowed
to appeal his treatment. After the binding is completed and Kratos and Bia are
not on stage, Prometheus is given a voice and he can narrate his own story,
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which he does twice—fonce or the Oceanids and once for Io. His story and
interactions with the Chorus, Ocean and Io expose an organization of powers
which justifies his actions, but also depict him as a vulnerable, suffering victim
of a new, power-hungry ruler:
As soon as he had seated himself upon his father’s throne, he
immediately assigned to the deities their several privileges and
apportioned to them their proper powers. But of wretched mortals he took
no notice, desiring to bring the whole race to an end and create a new one
in its place. Against this purpose none dared make stand except me— I
only had the courage; I saved mortals so that they did not descend,
blasted utterly, to the house of Hades. This is why I am bent by such
grievous tortures, painful to suffer, piteous to behold. I who gave mortals
first place in my pity, I am deemed unworthy to win this pity for myself,
but am in this way mercilessly disciplined, a spectacle that shames the
76
glory of Zeus.
While in Hesiod’s Works and Days Prometheus’ punishment is depicted in order
to show how a mighty Zeus punishes his unruly subordinates, here he is the
new despot, who abuses his powers in order to impose his new rule. The central
element in Prometheus’ story is pity, by means of which he differentiates
himself from Zeus. Scarry argues that it is precisely in the case of unstable, new
power that acts of cruelty such as torture are most prevalent:
The physical pain is so incontestably real that it seems to confer its
quality of “incontestable reality” on that power that has brought it into
being. It is, of course, precisely because the reality of that power is so
highly contestable, the regime so unstable, that torture is being used.77
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When a regime is new (and, thus, unstable), turture is inflicted not on random
citizens, but to those who constitute a danger for the regime. Prometheus’ story
in Prometheus Bound differs from the one told by Hesiod, although Aeschylus
takes his inspiration from Hesiod’s account. Prometheus is a Titan here, the son
of Ge. Why would Prometheus, through granting humans fire, be a danger to
Zeus is difficult to answer directly, but Mark Griffith tries an explanation that
is consistent with the play:
Along with P.’s new parentage come two major innovations, both
involving P.’s knowledge of the future. First, the dramatist has
transferred to P. the role performed by Ge in Hesiod’s Titanomachy, that
of providing the crucial advice which enabled Zeus and the Olympians to
defeat the Titans (…). Secondly, P. is now endowed with a further piece of
knowledge upon which the survival of Zeus’ rule depends. The origin of
this motif may lie in Hesiod’s account of Zeus’ marriage with Metis, and
the birth of Athena, in which Ge again provided vital advice (Th. 886900); but the more immediate source appears to be Pind. I. 8. 27ff (…)
where Themis saves Zeus and Poseidon from trying to marry Thetis, by
telling them of the prophecy that Thetis will bear a son mightier than his
father (so the gods marry her off to Peleus). In combining this motif with
the story of P., the author of Prom. has added a new dimension to the
struggle between P. and Zeus: indeed, P.’s foreknowledge becomes the key
to the resolution of the whole drama.78
Griffith alludes to the fact that Prometheus’ stealing of the fire is not the sole
reason for Zeus’ wrath. Whatever his motives are, there is definitely not much
said in Prometheus Bound by any of the characters to project a benevolent
image of Zeus. He is depicted as a severe and cruel ruler, especially after Io’s
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account of her misfortunes, at 640-686, where Zeus’ lust is the cause of all her
suffering. But in Aeschylus’ play, all gods are compassionate to Prometheus’
fate, which raises several questions. There is no account in the whole play, other
than in the beginning, in Kratos’ orders, where Zeus’ actions are condoned. All
characters who come in contact with Prometheus are sympathetic to the hero
and, while fearful, they never explicitly agree with Zeus’ punishment. In fact
the Chorus, comprised of Oceanus’ daughters, uses harsh words to condemn
Zeus’ behaviour and the way in which he exercises his power:
Chorus
Who of the gods is so hard of heart as to exult in this? Who does not
sympathize with your woes—save only Zeus? But he in malice, has set his
soul inflexibly and keeps in subjection the race sprung from Uranus; nor
will he stop, until he has satiated his soul or another seizes his
79
impregnable empire by some device of guile.
By emphasizing the harshness of Zeus’ rule, the effect obtained is that
Prometheus, and along with him the whole human race (whose well-being is the
reasons for the hero’s suffering, so the public, in connecting with Prometheus, is
“bound” to feel some guilt), is subjected to Zeus’ harsh rule and is in danger of
suffering the same as the hero. Although Prometheus’ suffering is intense and
his indignation even more so, the narration of his story seems to alleviate some
of the pain, for he is convinced that what he has done to save the human race is
justified. Moreover, since he can foresee the future, he is even aluding to a
future clemency act towards Zeus. Prometheus’ sufferings and Zeus’ torture all
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function within a system, which they both know well. It seems that in this
system Zeus is not the all-powerful ruler that Hesiod portrays.

3.1.3 Ananke
As I was discussing in the second chapter of this thesis, one notion that
binds many of the tragic elements together is that of ananke—necessity. The
gods are also subjected to this system and Prometheus, who has the gift of
foresight, knows well that there is an end to his ordeal and that Zeus is not
completely in charge of Prometheus’ fate. Although Prometheus is bound to
suffer in space, in his present, he is still able to come out of the moment of his
suffering and project himself to a future where the situation is changed and he
is no longer in a vulnerable position, tied to a rock. Such moments, contrasted
with those moments during which he is completely subjected to the now of the
pain, contextualize and explain a world where things are everchanging, even for
gods. Several narratives are used to explain and alleviate pain. Such is this
account, which, through a projection in the future, Prometheus counters the
harshness of a despotic Zeus in the present with a wiser, more humane ruler:
Prometheus
I know that Zeus is harsh and keeps justice in his own hands; but
nevertheless one day his judgement will soften, when he has been
crushed in the way that I know. Then, calming down his stubborn wrath,
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he shall at last bond with me in union and friendship, as eager as I am to
80
welcome him.
According to this, Zeus himself, through the necessity of suffering, will be
transformed and will create a bond with the Titan whom he is now torturing.
Since foresight allows Prometheus to access whichever point he chooses on the
time axis, his pain is also put in perspective. However, pain, when it is intense,
binds one fully to the present moment, so the fact that Prometheus is able to
look into the future means that he is either not in intense physical pain or that
he has passed a limit of pain through which he is able to function in a liminal
space and time. In Prometheus’ case, I would argue that the former is the case,
since his pain, although hard to endure and extended throughout a long period
of time is never expressed as intensely as Io’s pain.
While on the subject of ananke, one may wonder whether there is such an
idea in tragedy as a necessity of pain. In Prometheus’ case, his suffering is not
contextualized in order to explain such a necessity, but he does give an account
of his reasons for the crime that put him in chains:
Prometheus
No, do not think it is from pride or even from wilfulness that I am silent.
Painful thoughts devour my heart as I behold myself maltreated in this
way. And yet who else but I definitely assigned their prerogatives to
these upstart gods? But I do not speak of this; for my tale would tell you
nothing except what you know. Still, listen to the miseries that beset
mankind—how they were witless before and I made them have sense and
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endowed them with reason. I will not speak to upbraid mankind but to
set forth the friendly purpose that inspired my blessing.
First of all, though they had eyes to see, they saw to no avail; they had
ears, but they did not understand; but, just as shapes in dreams,
throughout their length of days, without purpose they wrought all things
in confusion. They had neither knowledge of houses built of bricks and
turned to face the sun nor yet of work in wood; but dwelt beneath the
ground like swarming ants, in sunless caves. They had no sign either of
winter or of flowery spring or of fruitful summer, on which they could
depend but managed everything without judgment, until I taught them to
discern the risings of the stars and their settings, which are difficult to
distinguish.
Yes, and numbers, too, chiefest of sciences, I invented for them, and the
combining of letters, creative mother of the Muses’ arts, with which to
hold all things in memory. I, too, first brought brute beasts beneath the
yoke to be subject to the collar and the pack-saddle, so that they might
bear in men’s stead their heaviest burdens; and to the chariot I harnessed
horses and made them obedient to the rein, to be an image of wealth and
luxury. It was I and no one else who invented the mariner’s flaxenwinged car that roams the sea.
Wretched that I am—such are the arts I devised for mankind, yet have
81
myself no cunning means to rid me of my present suffering.
Prometheus is the intermediary between the heaven and earth; he is also the
patron of the arts on Earth—he creates, in human physical terms, a world that
did not exist and for this he must suffer. However, while he has the power to
help the human race and create a new world, which, depicted in these verses
resembles a utopia, he is not capable of liberating himself from a breaking-down
of his own world through pain. The world that Prometheus is proud to have
created is developed in corporeal terms first, then in the extensions of the
bodies. The human world is an undefined mass that Prometheus shapes into an
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orderly universe, but he must suffer for his creation. He appears, here, as a selfeffacing humanitarian. However, as he is in great suffering because of his
actions, he is also, so to speak, the sufferer of those actions. While he is telling
his story, Zeus’ rule is gradually left in the background and another narrative
emerges: that of the necessity of suffering. To suffer as an effect of an action is
to be objected to that action. Pain, however, brings actuality and presence back,
taking the sufferer out of the equation. After exercising his power and creating
a world, setting this newly-created world to be the object that is being
constructed and organized, Prometheus is himself objectified by Zeus through
torture. Prometheus recognizes that ananke is such that gods and humans alike
must abide by its rules, as he explains bellow:
Chorus
Do not benefit mortals beyond reason and disregard your own distress;
although, I am confident that you will be freed from these bonds and will
have power in no way inferior to Zeus.
Prometheus
Not in this way is Fate, who brings all to fulfillment, destined to complete
this course. Only when I have been bent by pangs and tortures infinite
am I to escape my bondage. Skill is weaker by far than Necessity.
Chorus
Who then is the helmsman of Necessity?
Prometheus
The three-shaped Fates and mindful Furies.
Chorus
Can it be that Zeus has less power than they do?
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Prometheus
Yes, in that even he cannot escape what is foretold.
Chorus
Why, what is fated for Zeus except to hold eternal sway?
Prometheus
This you must not learn yet; do not be over-eager.
Chorus
It is some solemn secret, surely, that you enshroud in mystery.
Prometheus
Think of some other subject, for it is not the proper time to speak of this.
No matter what, this must be kept concealed; for it is by safeguarding it
82
that I am to escape my dishonorable bonds and outrage.
Zeus, Prometheus, Io, all mortals and everyone else are subjected to ananke, but
as I was explaining in the first chapter, necessity does not have a set of clear
rules; nor do we, readers, have enough information to build a system of
necessity in tragedy. Moreover, ananke is not a concept that intermediates, that
gives access to an abstract notion or space. Here, it seems that necessity is used
to expose the vulnerability, or even finiteness of both gods and humans—it is a
mysterious entity that does not allow aggrandizing self-projections, nor inflated
egos, such as Zeus’, to rule in confidence for too long. It is a concept that,
together with pain, transcends extensions, bringing back the concrete, the real.
3.1.4 Pathei Mathos
Another idea in light of which Prometheus’ and Io’s sufferings can be
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interpreted is πάθει µάθος, or learning through suffering. This following passage
in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon illustrates the concept, but he applies it to mortals
only:
Zeus, who sets mortals on the path to understanding, Zeus, who has
established as a fixed law that “wisdom comes by suffering.” But even as
trouble, bringing memory of pain, drips over the mind in sleep, so wisdom
83
comes to men, whether they want it or not.
Here, Zeus is the one who imparts the suffering through which understanding is
achieved—so a process of exposure to suffering that leads to wisdom. In
Prometheus’ case, his pain does not lead to understanding—there is no process
through which he achieves greater wisdom. Nor is there such a process of
suffering through which higher understanding and, perhaps, the alleviation of
pain could be acheieved, in the case of Io. In fact, Io’s final lines express the
pinnacle of pain in the whole play. As she goes off to continue her wanderings,
she wails:
Io
Oh! Oh! Alas! Once again convulsive pain and frenzy, striking my brain,
inflame me. I am stung by the gadfly’s barb, unforged by fire. My heart
knocks at my ribs in terror; my eyeballs roll wildly round and round. I am
carried out of my course by a fierce blast of madness; I’ve lost all mastery
over my tongue, and a stream of turbid words beats recklessly against the
84
billows of wretched doom.
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Io’s character in Prometheus Bound has been discussed widely85 and her role in
the play is not the focus of this discussion, but her pain does bring up several
important points. Since, as I noted above, her pain seems to be more intense
that Prometheus’, but she does have the alternative of death, she is, in a
grotesque shape and state, the epiphany of suffering in the three plays I am
analyzing. However, her condition is such that she cannot learn from it; there is
no pathei mathos, no positivist notion of suffering to be brought forth here. I
conclude, in relation to the much-vehiculated notion of learning through
adversity in Greek tragedy that Aeschylus did not mean to depict pain as a
process of understanding. It is possible, however, that both he and Sophocles
saw pain as an element of purification from ambition or projection outside of the
body. Io, for instance, is a beautiful maiden, on the brink of sexual maturation,
who is metamorphosed into a cow and subjected to constant pain and endless
wanderings: a most cruel punishment. But through her pain, she is able to
access the στυγνῆς κύµασιν ἄτης (the billows of wretched doom), which seems to
refer to Hades or to death. Io’s pain can be seen as purifying by touching the
limits of everything that is corporeal function. However, this fragment comes
after Prometheus’ account of her future, which gives hope—so her pain is
contextualized differently, although she is constantly testing the limits of life in
her condition.

For example in Stephen White, “Io’s World: Intimations of Theodicy in Prometheus
Bound,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 121 (2001): 107-140.
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3.2 Philoctetes
Philoctetes is Sophocles’ play that focuses on the main character’s pain.
Philoctetes is not a Greek hero in the traditional sense. In this play, he is
defined against Odysseus, who plays the role of a cunning diplomat, sending
Neoptolemus to steal the bow from its rightful owner. The explanation is that
the greater cause, the state of a nation, is more important than Philoctetes’ fate.
Adamantly, the hero refuses to join Odysseus, whom he has a great deal of
enmity towards, after he had been abandoned on a deserted island, with a pussinfected wound on his foot, by the Homeric hero. Philoctetes is the suffering
hero par excellence, but there is nothing majestic or heroic in his pain. However,
because he is none of these things (a warrior, conqueror, diplomat, etc.), he is
the personification of the humbled hero; pain has taught him the opposite of the
narcissistic grandeur of the epic hero. He is always about to have an attack of
pain, so he does not spend more energy that he must in order to feed himself
and survive. He is stuck on the island of Lemnos, forlorn at the end of the world.
3.2.1 The Eremitic Space
In the opening lines of Philoctetes, when Odysseus introduces the suffering
body of the hero and makes very clear his strangeness, by placing him in the
deserted land of Lemnos, he says, speaking to Neoptolemus:

86
86

This is the coast of the land of sea-girt Lemnos, a land untrodden by
men and uninhabited. Here, oh Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, one brought
up by the man who is mightiest among Greeks, that I exposed at some
time Poeas’ son, from Malis, being appointed to do so by the rulers,
because his foot was dripping with the disease that was eating through it.
We could attempt neither libation nor burnt sacrifice without hindrance,
but he was continually filling the camp with his savage curses, shrieking,
87
moaning.
Philoctetes is defined here as an other—a man who has become a strange,
unruly and bothersome beast. Expressed by Sophocles directly from the first
lines, his alienation is represented through an analogy with the desolate
surroundings of the exposed sick man. The reason for his desolation is the fact
that Philoctetes does not allow the others to carry on with their usual activities:
“ὅτ᾽ οὔτε λοιβῆς ἡµὶν οὔτε θυµάτων παρῆν ἑκήλοις προσθιγεῖν”
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(“we could not

attempt neither libation nor burnt sacrifice without hindrance”). Disease takes
over the whole life of the hero, his behavior is transformed, as he is reduced to a
shrieking, irritating being who gets in the way of others. In fact, there is a
synecdochic relationship between pain and man: his usual surroundings,
actions, his range of motion and most importantly, his agency, are all reduced to
here and now, by pain and the inarticulate expression of it.
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Philoctetes’ isolation on Lemnos as Rush Rehm shows in his essay The
Play of Space: Spatial Transformation in Greek tragedy, is similar to the
experience of a patient who is hospitalized, an experience that amplifies
isolation. The hospitalized person, just like Philoctetes, is removed from the
community; his clothes, through which he is connected to society, are taken
away. To come back to the aforementioned mind-body opposition which ceases
to exist when pain takes over: Philoctetes is not capable of transcending his
body, even when he wants to do so; he cannot control or contain the suffering.
His whole being becomes an expression of pain. It is almost as if pain were an
entity that takes over the hero’s body, a demon that possesses it. In these
opening lines, the vulnerability of the sufferer becomes apparent: the others
cannot and do not empathize with Philoctetes because firstly—it is not possible
to truly understand another’s suffering and secondly—because they can no
longer participate in life; and life must keep unfolding. The verbs that describe
Philoctetes’ behavior (βοῶν, στενάζων—shrieking, moaning), as well as the very
concrete and almost shocking mention, in line seven, of the cause of pain (νόσῳ
καταστάζοντα διαβόρῳ πόδα—his foot was dripping with the disease that was
eating through it), make clear the fact that Philoctetes has stopped behaving in
accordance with the laws of society because of his pain. He is entirely isolated.
This is what Leder calls “an epistemic block”—a wall that is erected between
sufferer and family, friends and the community, when pain intervenes. This gap
created between the sufferer and the world can only be solved by someone who
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takes the role of healer: someone who listens, understands and tolerates the
suffering; someone who makes sense of the inaccurate language used by the
sufferer to explain his disease and to express his pain.
The following passage starts at line 1081, after Philoctetes had his bow
stolen. He previously refused to follow Odysseus and Neoptolemus to Troy
because the one rule that Philoctetes abides by, even while suffering greatly, is
the one according to which his friends are worthy of praise, while his enemies of
hatred and revenge. Philoctetes addresses his place of dwelling directly, in
language that seems to be consoling, while emphasizing his own desolation,
through the association between the bleakness of the place, his disease and his
lack of agency, resulting from the fact that his bow, his only valuable belonging,
had been stolen earlier.
Philoctetes
Oh, hollow in the cavernous rock, hot (in summer) and icy cold (in
winter), so I was not, after all, going to leave you, never, wretch that I
am, but you will be conscious of me also (as I am) dying! Ah, me, me! Oh
dwelling much filled with pain, the pain coming from wretched me. What
will be for me daily? What hope associated with the provisions of food,
89
from where, will I, wretched, meet with?
One sentence in particular stands out in the above-quoted passage: “λλά µοι καὶ
θνῄσκοντι συνείσει” (but you will be conscious of me also (as I am) dying!). As in a
hospital, where most people spend their last days, Philoctetes is assuming that
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his end will come on the island of Lemnos, where he spent most of his sick days.
The following two verses strengthen this analogy: “ὦ πληρέστατον αὔλιον λύπας
τᾶς π᾽ ἐµοῦ τάλαν “(Oh, dwelling much filled with pain, the pain coming from
wretched me). The island, Philoctetes feels, in filled with pain, which comes
from himself, since his pain existed before he arrived in Lemnos. The island,
however, has become like him, even part of him, through the transference of
pain; now it is a place associated with disease and suffering, just like a hospital.
Lemnos reflects the patient’s state of mind (and body). In the following passage,
which comes at the end of the play, after Heracles has commanded him to follow
Neoptolemus and Odysseus to Troy, where he will be cured of his disease,
Philoctetes turns again towards Lemnos, his place of suffering and
transformation:
Philoctetes
Come now, let me call to this land as I depart. Farewell, oh house that
shared watch with me. Farewell, nymphs living in the waters and the
meadows, and the male pounding of the sea against the promontory,
where often in the recess (of the cave), my head was wetted by the south
wind’s blasts, and where many times Mt. Hermaion mount sent me, in
my suffering, a groaning lament in response to my voice’s groaning
lament. But now, oh you clear springs and Lycian water, we are leaving
you, leaving you indeed, never having entered on this belief! Farewell,
sea-surrounded land of Lemnos, and send me on a fair voyage without
blame, send me to the destination that mighty Fate appoints and the will
of my friends, and by the all-subduing god who has accomplished these
90
things.
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The imagery used to describe Lemnos this time belongs to the surrounding
nature. These aspects have not been mentioned in the play until the end.
Lemnos is, up to this point, a place laden with pain. The emotional farewell,
emphasized by the repetition in “λείποµεν ὑµᾶς, λείποµεν ἤδη” (“we are leaving
you, leaving you indeed”) shows that suffering does, in fact, help create
connections. Here, Lemnos is almost anthropomorphized, or at least animated
by lively nymphs, winds and waters, in constant movement, whereas before it
was the place where Philoctetes dwelled in pain, barely able to provide for
himself. Among the different methods of employing language in order to depict
the hero’s state of pain in this play is the employment of the physical space,
which changes in accordance with his suffering. Gaston Bachelard, a twentieth
century French phenomenologist, writes in The Poetics of Space, that a place of
dwelling, a home, is altered by the imagination (and in the case of Philoctetes,
by his suffering) of the dweller:
All really inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home. In the
course of this work, we shall see that the imagination functions in this
direction whenever the human being has found the slightest shelter: we
shall see the imagination build “walls” of improbable shadows, comfort
itself with the illusion of protection—or, just the contrary, tremble behind
thick walls, mistrust the staunchest ramparts. In short, in the most
interminable of dialectics, the sheltered being gives perceptible limits to
his shelter. He experiences the house in its reality and in its virtuality, by
means of thought and dreams.91
Therefore, if Lemnos is the house of Philoctetes’ suffering, the reader or
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spectator can assess the state of the hero also by paying attention to the
description of his physical surroundings. From the interior of the two-mouthed
cave, harsh, either too cold or too hot, where the hero is stuck most of the time
when he is in intense pain, to the outside, as described in the above-quoted
passage—the dialectics of inside and outside—a dichotomy inherent to
phenomenology, show that pain and suffering are expressed in a multitude of
ways in ancient tragedy.
3.2.2 The Limits of Language
Building towards a theory of pain, Elaine Scarry argues that the
experience of pain escapes language, abandoning the victim confused and muted
by its incommunicability. Her argument is based on the assertion that language
is destroyed by pain: the experience is forceful and words fail as soon as one is
exposed to that kind of experience. It is impossible, according to her, to find a
manner of expressing pain that accurately articulates its severity. As Scarry
puts it: “physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it,
bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the
sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned.” There are
multiple examples of this process of reversion in Philoctetes, but the episode
where there is both a focus on the sounds and cries starts at line 732. Scarry
draws on this particular example in her book:
[T]hus Sophocles’s agonized Philoctetes utters a cascade of changing cries
and shrieks that in the original Greek are accommodated by an array of
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formal words (some of them twelve syllables long), but that at least one
translator found could only be rendered in English by the uniform
syllable “Ah” followed by variations in punctuation (Ah! Ah!!!!). But even
if one were to enumerate many additional examples, such cultural
differences, taken collectively, would themselves constitute only a very
narrow margin of variation and would thus in the end work to expose and
confirm the universal sameness of the central problem, a problem that
originates much less in the inflexibility of any one language or in the
shyness of any one culture than in the utter rigidity of pain itself: its
resistance to language is not simply one of its incidental or accidental
attributes but is essential to what it is.92
The passage Scarry refers to is the following one:
Philoctetes: Ai, ai!
Neoptolemus: What is it?
Philoctetes: Nothing terrible, but go ahead, oh child.
Neoptolemus: Is it pain from the disease that is (constantly) affecting
you?
Philoctetes: No, indeed, not at all. But just now I think I feel relief. Oh,
Gods!
Neoptolemus: Why do you call the gods, groaning thus?
Philoctetes: That they may come as saviours and kind towards us. Ai!
Ai!
Neoptolemus: What is happening to you? Speak, do not keep so silent. It
is evident that that you are suffering in some way.
Philoctetes: I am destroyed, boy, I can never conceal my suffering when
you are close. Ah! Ah! It goes through me, goes through! Oh, the pain, the
misery! I am destroyed, child, I am consumed! Aiaiaiaiaiai! Ah, by the
gods, child, I beg you, if you have a sword ready to hand, strike the top of
my foot, cut it off right away! Do not spare my life! Go ahead, child!
Neoptolemus: What has come on you thus suddenly new in regard to
which you make so much howling and groaning over yourself?
Philoctetes: You know, oh child.
Neoptolemus: What is it?
Philoctetes: You know, boy.
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Neoptolemus: What ails you? I do not know.
Philoctetes: How do you not know? Aiaiaiaiai!
Neoptolemus: Yes, terrible is the burden of the disease.
93
Philoctetes: Terrible that cannot be spoken! Oh, have pity upon me!
Here, exposing the inexpressibility of pain is at the core of this text, since
Philoctetes cannot even respond to Neoptolemus’ questions, (for example: “τί
τοὺς θεοὺς ὧδ᾽ ναστένων καλεῖς;”—”Why do you call the gods, groaning thus?”).
Philoctetes experiences a complete disconnection from any cognitive process
that could help him explain or narrate his experience. Neoptolemus is forced,
thus, to remain outside of the suffering and that causes, again, an extreme
alienation between the sufferer and anyone who could offer compassion (which
means, literally, “to suffer with”). While the disease is “δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ῥητόν”
(“terrible that it cannot be told”), a story of pain is still told, albeit through
inarticulate shrieks and phrases that are outside of the customary realm, like
Philoctetes’ pleads to have his ankle cut off. A shift occurs here between spheres
of language: although the language is not accurate, it does express something
for the hermeneut, for the one who has the inclination, training or time to listen
and make sense of it.
In Philoctetes, the vocabulary for pain is not extensive (“ἄλγος” is used
mainly) and Sophocles uses approximations quite often (for example he uses
“νόσηµα”, disease, to express the pain that Philoctetes feels). However, it is
important to mention that in Greek, there are several words for pain, each with
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a different connotation: λύπη, which is the most concrete use, meaning “pain in
the body,” ἀνία, meaning “sorrow, distress, trouble” and ἄχος, “pain, distress”
used to express mental anguish, but also physical suffering94. These facets of
pain also have their corresponding daimons.
To make use of an analogy—deciphering the language of pain is like
interpreting signs, giving sense to the incomprehensible. In the ancient Greek
context, interpreting the language of pain is quite natural. The Greek
vocabulary of the body is defined by multiplicity, even when expressed in its
entirety. Words used for body parts (for example καρδία - heart, πρόσωπον- face)
are used with a metonymic value: a part for the whole. The close relationship of
dependency between the physical and the psychological is done within an
intention that absorbs the body parts within itself.95 This vocabulary, then,
constitutes a code that allowed the Greeks to express and think about their
relationship with themselves, but also their relationship with the others. It also
expresses the relationship with the divine, with the gods, the ones that
Philoctetes calls to in the midst of his fits of pain, the gods who, should not be
forgotten, have a physical body as well, even though it is one that does not die
and does not suffer. Therefore, this symbolic system represented through
language and body parts is marked by the signs of limitation, deficiency,
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disease, a perishable body; one that reminds humans, especially through
suffering, that they are inferior to the divine super-body.
3.2.4 Trachiniae: Pain and Death by Centaur
When pain does not close the sufferer inside his own body or in an eremitic
space, when the hero in pain is not silenced by pain or reduced to a shrieking
creature, he is exposed through pain with all his defining traits and passions
amplified. Such is the case with Heracles in the Trachiniae, where he meets his
end by wearing the poisoned cloak sent him by his wife, Deianira. The cloak is
sent as a gift before the completion of his nostos, but the jealous Deianira adds
onto it an ointment made from the clotted blood of Nessus, the lustful centaur
killed by Heracles because, while carrying her across a stream, he made an
offensive advance (“ψαύει µαταίαις χερσίν”96—”he touched her with indecent
hands”). Nessus deceitfully advised Deianira to store the blood accumulating
around his wound and give it to Heracles in case of urgent need of a love charm
because “ἔσται φρενός σοι τοῦτο κηλητήριον/ τῆς Ἡρακλείας, ὥστε µήτιν᾽ εἰσιδὼν/
στέρξει γυναῖκα κεῖνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον”97 (“and this will be a love-charm for the
heart of Heracles, so that he will not ever love anyone he looks on more than
you”). The time has arrived when such a charm would be useful, since Heracles
has fallen in love and even send home his new mistress, the beautiful Iole,
before arriving back to Trachis himself. Deianira anxiously hatches a plan to get
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the ointment, by means of a cloak, to Heracles, who is at the time on the island
of Euboea, celebrating his conquest over the city Oechalia (Iole’s home city). The
ointment is in fact a deadly poison; Heracles is in focus as a character only after
the contact with the poison. Cypris is deeply involved in all of this—she is
mentioned by the Chorus several times (497-506, 860)—as this is a play of
soaring passions. When pain appears in the equation, at 765, the spirits have
already been lit by what has transpired in Heracles’ absence. The moment of
contact with the cloak is a valuable one to look at, since Heracles’ first reaction
when exposed to pain is significant for what follows in the play:
At first - oh wretched man! - he prayed in calm
of mind, rejoicing in his lovely garment;
but when the gory flame began to blaze
up from the offerings on the sappy pine,
sweat covered all his body, and the robe
clung to his sides as if glued by a craftsman
to every joint; and from his very bones
shot up spasmodic, stinging pangs: the poison,
like some detested, bloody snake’s, devoured him.
Then he cried out aloud for ill-starred Lichas,
who was in no way guilty of your crime,
to ask what treachery made him bring the robe;
but he, unlucky man! knew not, and answered
he had but brought the gift which you had given.
When Heracles heard this a penetrating
convulsive spasm clutched his lungs, and he
seized Lichas where the ankle joins the foot
and dashed him on a rock swept by the sea
so that the white brain seeped among his hairs,
98
and all his shattered skull was bloodied over.
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Firstly, the dramatic transition from Heracles’ calm state of mind just before a
sacrifice (however ironic that juxtaposition may seem) to the state of pain, with
all the physical signs, seen by Hyllus, his son (the above-quoted passage is in a
longer accusatory monologue that Hyllus addresses to Denaira) is remarkable
style-wise. Sophocles builds up the moment of contact with pain and the impact
is quite effective. The pain is announced by the “φλὸξ” (flame) and the first sign
of pain are “ἱδρὼς ἀνῄει χρωτί” (sweat rolled over all his skin). Until here, the
language describing pain is the same one used to describe love. As the poison
starts to take effect, the words used by Hyllus to depict Heracles’ agony stay in
the same semantic field: “προσπτύσσεται πλευραῖσιν ἀρτίκολλος” (the close-fitting
robe embraced his sides), he is shaken by “ἀδαγµὸς ἀντίσπαστος” (spasmodic
pain), and, the cluster of images and references “εἶτα φοινίας ἐχθρᾶς ἐχίδνης ἰὸς ὣς
ἐδαίνυτο” (then the poison feasted on him like that of a hated viper’s). The viper
reference sends to Hydra, whose killing by Heracles constitutes one of his
labours. The Hydra is also referenced at 573-4, when Nessus explains that
Heracles’ arrow, which is killing him, is dipped in Hydra’s poisonous blood. As
Deianira gathers the blood around the wound, which makes its way to Heracles
to poison him, it seems that the circularity of the narrative is indicating that
Heracles is given his due, while Deianira is only an intermediary in a greater
design. Heracles is Zeus’ son, a demi-god (deified after death) and under
constant watch by the gods, but here the workings of ananke are always in the
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background of the plot. Nor is Lichas guilty of any crime, as Hyllus points out,
but Heracles’ pain is externalized and directed at him. Lichas’ gory death
foreshadows the ending of the play and the way Heracles’ pain is manifested
subsequently.
Heracles feels pain just like the other tragic characters—he is weakened,
exposed and made vulnerable just like Philoctetes and Prometheus. In fact, his
experience of pain is even more humiliating than that of Philoctetes seen in
light of the heroic greatness of his past, coming after the onerous toils that he
had to endure; he is reduced to a powerless, whimpering or groaning creature
and, most disgracing of all, resembling a girl:
Go, child, be bold! And pity me, for I
am pitiful indeed as I lie sobbing
and moaning like a virgin! No one living
has ever seen me act like this before;
for I have never groaned at my misfortunes
99
till now, when I have proved myself a woman.
Before the moment of pain and death depicted in the Trachiniae, Heracles had
put a lot of effort into to proving himself to be a virile demi-god, the true son of
Zeus. It is, therefore, ironic and not accidental that in his pain and death he
would be shown in his most defenseless, weak posture, which he is, in fact,
trying to counter by becoming more and more tyrannical. It is also not
accidental that the first time we take account of Heracles, as he comes into the
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play as a character, he is unconscious, then, waking up, realizes the agony he is
in, desires to die in order to end it—these are all reactions to pain that are
within the range of typical behaviour. However, as the pain intensifies, Heracles
shows a vicious, bestial side. Penelope Biggs argues in her essay The Disease
Theme in Sophocles that Heracles’ agony is defined by his lecherous nature,
which is intensified by disease:
The disease of Heracles represents the intensification of the lust inherent
in his nature; this meaning is correlated throughout with the “half-beast”
imagery of the play, and shortly after this passage we have the mention
of Nessus (555ff.), as if to reinforce the picture of Achelous. Nessus, who
was not fighting for Deianeira on the honourable level of the marriage
contest, is always ho thēr to her and to the chorus (556, 568, 662, 680,
707, 935); but later on we are reminded that the centaurs too are “doublenatured” (1095). By the end of the play Nessus has poetically executed
Heracles for the lust which had cost him his life at Heracles’ hands. From
victory over bull-god and centaur to hideous death in the poisoned robe is’
all too short a step, as short as that which in the chorus’ minds separates
the winning of Deianeira from the capture of Iole.100
Biggs’ reading is accurate, but if we consider the other elements of the story (the
fact that Heracles dies by his own poison or the reason of his death, which is his
lust for Iole that prompts Deianira to send him the toxic ointment), Heracles
becomes the “half-beast,” while the cloak, an extension of his own body, turns
against him. This, Heracles does not recognize, as he is blaming Deianira for his
agony, but his words describe that which inflicts pain, the poisonous cloak, as

Penelope Biggs, “Disease Theme in Sophocles’ Ajax, Philoctetes and Trachiniae”
Classical Philology, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Oct., 1966), 228-9, with the mention that ho thēr (ὃ
θήρ) is a beast of prey.
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both outside and inside his body, taking over his entire organism:
Glued to my sides, it eats my flesh away
deep down within, and dwells inside my lungs
choking my breath: already it has drunk
my fresh warm blood and wasted my whole body,
binding me with unutterable chains.
And yet, no spearman on the battlefield,
no earth-born troop of Giants, no wild beast,
nor Greece, nor any foreign land which I
purged in my wanderings, could do this to me!
A woman - weak, not masculine by nature –
101
alone, without a sword, has vanquished me!
That which was supposed to enflame Heracles’ desire, the “κηλητήριον” (lovecharm) falsely prescribed by Nessus, ends up killing him; the language used to
describe it can also be, once more, the language of Eros. The great hero of the
Greek world has apparently been destroyed by a woman, not in battle, as it
would have been honourable. The duality is inherent in Heracles’ persona, as it
is in his fate and his pain. His agony exposes the contrasts represented in the
last third of the play as extreme. Pain, in this case, takes the hero to the limits
of his character, disclosing his egomania through a long psychosis that ends in a
ritual of burning him alive—perhaps a purifying flaming, that frees Heracles of
the burden of his ego.
In all three plays discussed above I have shown how pain can expose and
actualize through both setting and forcing limits. Aeschylus and Sophocles were
aware of the power pain held and used it to reveal that which cannot be
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expressed by means of the celebrated myths, which were well-known narratives
in classical Greece. Rather, by using the myths everyone was familiar with and
adding the testing element (the extreme contingency, the pain) and by putting
emphasis, thus, on ananke, the poets were the emissaries of a different kind of
teaching, perhaps an esoteric one. The exposure to pain is not done in tragedy,
as I have emphasized before, as a manner of transcending the physical and
connecting to the divine. Instead, pain in tragedy appears to work like a healing
method, but not a healing in mundane terms; rather, the healing seems to be
that of a spiritual type, which actualizes and sets one in the present, baring him
of all extensions, pretence, covers, tricks and braveries. When confronting pain,
the tragic characters are naked and the poets want the public to see their heroes
in this condition.
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Conclusion and Further Considerations
I chose these three plays only for their textual treatment of pain, the
palpable presentation of the circumstances of pain and the interconnectedness
of the three characters in myth and tragedy. Heracles, for example, is Io’s heir,
the one who will eventually free Prometheus, as Prometheus himself announces
in his prophecy, in a dialogue with the Chorus.102 Moreover, Philoctetes carries
Heracles’ bow, given to him when he is the only one who accepts to light the
pyre, burning and releasing Heracles from the suffering caused by the poisonous
cloak, as depicted in the Trachiniae. One line of interpretation here, which could
prove valuable in a future study, but does not fit confines of the argument in
this thesis, is that pain is thus transferred from Heracles to Philoctetes through
the bow—the only valuable belonging that Philotetes has and relies on in his
isolation on the island of Lemnos. These three heroes, all men, all virile
warriors, have in common their exposed vulnerability. Tragedy, by using
mythological variants, challenges mythological archetypes and in these three
plays I am arguing that it does so by exposing the heroes to the experience of
pain. There are several women figures in tragedy that I would like to look at in
relation to pain in a future study, such as Cassandra in Aeschylus’
Agammemnon, and Io in Prometheus Bound. Also, in Sophocles’ extant plays,
Antigone is a figure of suffering and anguish, who struggles against an unjust
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political authority, Jocasta in Oedipus Rex, as well as Electra. Although I am
arguing, in the introduction to this thesis, for the exclusion of Euripides from a
study of ancient pain, I do think that his plays are not utterly contaminated by
Aristotle’s advancement of plot and character as dominating concepts and I
would like, in the future, to do a thorough analysis of several plays, such as
Medea, Hipollytus and Andromache, where pain and suffering play a central
role. In relation to this aspect, what this study lacks is a thorough textual
analysis and a layer of gender theory that I am gesturing towards, but not
addressing directly. As I explain in the introduction, I am choosing to focus here
on discourse analysis, using this methodology to clean the slate for a fresher
analysis, devoid of elements of dualism and Aristotelian categorization, which
cloud a modern reception of tragedy. I am also wary of adding another layer of
discourse on the ancient texts, one that is not necessarily compatible with the
tragic sphere. For this reason, I am only suggesting and pointing to the gender
aspects of these plays presently. I do think, however, that gender theories can
add a dimension to a study of pain in tragedy that would open discourse and
generate a productive discussion. Judith Butler’s book Antigone’s Claim:
Kinship between Life and Death is a good example of how gender studies can aid
a discussion of tragic figures. In my case, I would still like to focus, in any
related future study, on the nucleus of pain in tragedy, as a notion of limit and
on deconstructing any conceptual system before using it as lens for analysis.
Another aspect that I excluded here, one that is essential for a study of
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pain, is that of the performance. This is perhaps the most problematic choice I
had to make due to the space and time restriction. While many times I refer to
the role of the spectator in tragedy, especially in relation to Aristotle’s concepts,
this is never thoroughly discussed in this thesis. One of the reasons for my
choice is the fact that performance aspects in classical scholarship are mostly
based on textual references and assumptive contextualization, meaning that we
do not have access to concrete evidence that can ground studies of performance
of Attic tragedy. However, there are many valuable studies that do explore the
dynamics of performance and that advance compelling arguments. For example,
David Wiles’ work Mask and Performance in Greek Tragedy: From Ancient
Festival to Modern Experimentation looks at performance in relation to ritual by
considering the social and religious context of the tragedies. Wiles advances the
idea that the mask is an instrument of disguising and manipulating the gaze, as
well as playing an important role in the relation between actor and public. He
uses, for his study, archaeological evidence, as well as anthropological
assessment and textual confirmation. For a study of performance based mainly
on textual evidence and, more specifically, on the analysis of prosody in Greek
poetry, A. P. David’s book The Dance of the Muses: Choral Theory and Ancient
Greek Poetics is a valuable source. David develops a theory of accent, linking
poetry to performance, more precisely to dance. He explains the purpose of his
study thus:
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[T]he phenomenon of agreement, between metrical ictus and word-level
accent, leads us via a historical sourcing of this ictus, not, as in English,
in an automatic linguistic pattern of prosodic alternation, but in the
documented extra-linguistic phenomenon of dance, to the synthetic notion
of choreia (χορεία). Analysed by Plato into its elements of ‘rhythm’ and
‘harmony’, χορεία becomes a rubric under which to contextualize and
exploit the new theory of the accent. Accent corresponds to harmony and
ictus to rhythm. We shall see that χορεία is a concept that opens new
approaches, radically new and yet radically authentic, into the poetics of
ancient poetry.103
This study is a good example of language-based scholarship that leads to
performance studies related to Greek tragedy. By strengthening the link
between metrics and χορεία, David advances the possibility of studying the
ritualistic aspect of performance in tragedy.
Oliver Taplin’s book Greek Tragedy in Action provides a compelling
introduction to the universe of tragic performance104. Taplin argues that, in
spite of the shift of focus in the last decades from written word to the
performance of Greek theatre, both of them are important. This book is written
for a larger public rather than for a specialized one, so it is mostly concerned
with introducing aspects of performance, while relating them to text. The
author does not, however, go into much depth when introducing key concepts,
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such as emotions, representation and the chorus.
Two other studies that are worth mentioning here focus on the space of
performance, which I briefly commented on in the third chapter of this thesis, in
relation to the eremitic place of suffering in Prometheus Bound and Philoctetes.
These two works, however, go further with their study of space in Greek
tragedy, examining the space of performance and its implications. Graham Ley,
in The Theatricality of Greek Tragedy: Playing Space and Chorus addresses the
playing space “by working backwards from textual evidence, practical
implications of the surviving scripts and often on those forms of research that
have been conducted practically.”105 He further notes that “[i]n order to
appreciate the kind of theater that Greek tragedy was, we need to understand
the conditions for which the scripts were composed, and (…) to do that we need
to work substantially in reverse, from the scripts to the conditions for which
they were composed.”106 The other aspect that Ley comments on in his book is
that of the chorus, although he is careful to mention that his study of the chorus
is one based on different “proposals” and performance theories that have been
advanced in the past “because [a study of the chorus] involves questions of
music and dancing and our own cultural puzzlement over this kind of
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performance for which we have no real equivalent.”107
The second work focusing on spatiality in Greek tragedy is Rush Rehm’s
The Play of Space: Spatial Transformation in Greek Tragedy. Rehm defines his
method of study as “spatial semiotics,”108 defining his position against
structuralist readings of space in tragedy, where binaries (such as
inside/outside, masculine/feminine space distinctions) are prevalent. This is a
compelling study, which brings up, from the beginning, the questions of
ambiguity in interpretation, metaphoric implications of treating space as an
extension of the self, essentialism and positivism. Based on my own research,
this work seems to be one of the most thorough and involved studies of space in
tragedy. I would like to use these works as a starting point for an analysis of
pain in relation to performance in Greek tragedy in the future. One of the
pressing issues that should be treated in a further study on this subject is that
of representation and form in relation to pain. In deconstructing Aristotle’s
mimetic system in the first chapter of this thesis, I did not advance a theory of
representation of my own. Nor did I, however, discard this issue. I simply chose
to focus, in this thesis, on discourse patterns that interfere with a potential
analysis of pain and representation. This does not mean that I am not
acknowledging that structure and form are essential components of tragedy and
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pain does split structures, but it is also contained by them. Greek tragedy relies
on representation, but my study here advances solely the idea that Aristotle’s
mimesis does not provide the tools for analysis that would be compatible with
the tragic sphere. A future analysis of representation and pain would include
elements of performance, such as the stage, music, metrics, the mask, the
chorus and the public, all of which play an important role in the tragic realms
and, specifically, in relation to pain.
Moreover, it would be necessary to include several other approaches in
order to nuance an analysis of pain and contextualize it more accurately. One
such frame of reference would be that of ancient medicine, with a focus on
diagnostics. The approach to pain and the body in the ancient context, as I have
discussed, is fundamentally different and not affected by Plato’s dualism, nor by
Christianity’s rendering of the body in opposition to the soul and to God. As
Aristotle approaches tragedy with the intention of cleansing it of its rawness by
applying the mimetic model as an analgesic formula, ancient medicine works to
cure and alleviate pain, but it does so through a system that does not hide the
pain and the body. This would expose a facet of the Greek culture that would
reveal the way in which pain would have affected the spectator and whether
catharsis was indeed a purgation of sorts or rather a different kind of experience
that the Greeks were familiar with.
Another axis of analysis that was left out here due to lack of space was
the connection between pain in tragedy and pleasure. Without going so far as to
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adopt a psychoanalytic approach, a process of hermeneutical analysis would be
useful in determining whether on the other side of the threshold of pain there is
at least a hint of ecstasy. This aspect could help in testing the grounds for an
interpretation of catharsis, without using it as an intermediating concept in the
education of emotional purgation of the public. In relation to this and by linking
tragedy, through pain, with the ritualistic context, an exploration of the possible
spiritual influences in tragedies could be a compelling axis of research.
Overall, this hard-to-contain project reflects the nature of pain itself, as I
see it: breaking through constructs reveals a world that, through the painful
splitting of patterns, bares a profoundly human vulnerability which inheres in
both life and in tragedy.
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